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PREFACE 
Serious efforts must be made to combat the high accident rate 
on the roads in the Republic of South Africa. The same spirit which 
exists in the field of medicine when there are evidences that an 
epidemic is beginning to take its toll, must come into being amongst 
those who are concerned with traffic and its problems. The public 
itself needs to become more aware of road safety. Many associations 
and institutions have been created to assist with the inculcation of 
the road safety ideal. The National Road Safety Council, which 
creates opportunities for investigation into aspects of road safety 
must continue to expand its sphere of influence. 
The research project contained on the following pages represents 
an attempt to contribute to the human factor in traffic safety, 
particularly by making a closer study of the driver of the motor 
vehicle. The writer is concerned with the carnage that is caused by 
road accidents. His previous study of personality and particularly 
of the projective techniques of assessment has prompted a consideration 
of the problem. 
The spade work for the research was done under the guidance of 
Professor D.Z. de Villiers, to whom the writer is grateful for various 
reasons . First and foremost it was a privilege to learn the value of 
an integrated clinical approach and secondly the wide experience of 
Professor de Villiers as a Rorschach technician brought subleties and 
intricacies of interpretation not readily available ~n a text. All in 
all, the writer, from the start of a Masters degree spent years learn-
ing the Rorschach from this clinician. 
(ii) 
The writer is deeply grateful to Mr. H.W. Page for his willing-
ness to take over the promotion of the research when Professor 
de Villiers retired. The concern for methodology and the guidance 
given by Mr. Page has been of inestimable worth to the writer. The 
co-operation of Professor Kruger on more recent Rorschach interpret-
ation is appreciated. 
Special thanks are offered to the following: 
a. Professor A.J. la Grange, who saw the merits of 
such personality research and who helped to make 
available a National Road Safety grant to the 
writer . 
b. The General Manager and staff of the Durban 
Municipal Transport Company for the months 
of assistance during the testing periods. 
c . Mr . T. Bowden, of Shire Construction, who 
patiently worked with the writer in the 
adaptation of an apparatus for use in the 
t esting procedure of the research. 
d. Professor F. Calitz for his assistance in 
the planning of the statistical model, the 
writing of the computer programmes, and 
the work at the computer. 
e. Professor R.R. Holt, of the New York Univer-
sity who made available to the writer so much 
material on primary and secondary process 
thinking, and who bolstered the interest of 
the writer by his enquiries regarding the 
progress of the research project. 
Finally all the others, especially those at home, who 
never failed with their encouragement, are sincerely thanked. 
Oelrich Nell 
1974 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America suffered 9,353 deaths and 
32,355 seriously wounded during the first five years of the war 
in Vietnam. Yet an equal number of persons was killed on the 
roads in the United States during two months ~n 1966 . A similar 
high road fatality rate exists ~n many parts of the world and 
South Africa is no exception. Concern has been expressed with the 
continued rise of fatalities in South Africa despite better roads 
and safer vehicles. The Honourable J . W. Rall, Deputy Minister of 
Transport, spoke as follows in an address at the National Road 
Safety Council Symposium in Pretoria: 
"Ons padongeZukke mag vergeZyk word met 
'n bosbrand - sekerZik die grootste in 
ons geskiedenis . Die vZamme skiet hoog 
die Zug in~ orals ontstaan daar nuwe 
verwoestende vZamme ... . 
(Rall, 1973, p. 4) 
In 1970, 7,948 people were killed ~n road accidents in 
South Africa, whilst the figure for the same period in Great 
Britain where there are so many more motor vehicles, was 7,501. 
During the last 20 years the number of road accidents, where 
death has occurred, has increased eight-fold. 
Such an accident rate has serious repercussions on the 
personal, social and economic spheres of life. It causes a 
tremendous strain on the remaining manpower of the country, 
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particularly when in many instances the fatalities are young people. 
In other accidents they are lucky to escape with their lives. A 
symposium conducted by the South African Neurological Society 1n 
Cape Town in 1969 was told that about 70% of young people injured 
in motor accidents received serious head injuries. 
Driving 1s a form of human behaviour which in a given society 
1s subject to self-imposed limits to activity. Normal people are 
usually also normal drivers, reasonably accident free with an inner 
control over their behaviour that is adequate . Concern exists for 
those individuals who do not show adequate control, and who are thus 
frequently involved in accidents. 
During the course of a day, many potentially dangerous situations 
arise. By virtue of the control which he exercises over his actions, 
the driver 1s able to avert danger. At times he must be more careful 
than otherwise. The types of drivers who find themselves in the 
potentially dangerous situations range from one end of the continuum 
to the other. Some are so careful and exercise such stringent control 
that movement becomes painful, and the others are so careless that 
movement also becomes painful! Because driving is such a highly 
complex task, drivers differ in their driving behaviour from very 
safe to very unsafe, or negligent. 
The stability of any particular driver is largely determined 
by an integration of many different characteristics. Thus physio-
logical aspects such as age, size, and sex; perceptual abilities 
and responses; intellectual characteristics; aspects of social 
interaction - all come into play when a vehicle is be{ng driven. 
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Goldstein (1961) pointed out that traffic eng1neers have maJ,. 
i~portant and substantial contributions to safe travel by the good 
system of roads which they have constructed. There is little, 
however, that can be done at the moment about the negligent or 
irresponsible driver. Much more must be known about the driver as 
a road-u?er. 
Considerable ~nowledge has of course been built up about 
certain aspects of the driver. Thus the age of the driver has been 
shown to be a significaqt risk factor, Younger people are possibly 
more physically fit and might have better motor co-ordination, but 
older people have greater experieqce of life situations and a greate r 
psychosocial maturity. Human perceptual abilities have been studi eu 
in the light of traffic system components, ~nd improved vehicle 
design~ have resulted from a consideration of the psychomotor func tions. 
The ma1n concern of the following study will be the thought 
processes uf the driver, and consideration of the possibility of 
thought processes influencing the actions ~f the driver. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STUDIES OF ACCIDENT REPEATERS 
The review of studies in the following chapter started 
with a consideration of the concept of accident proneness. Whilst 
the concept of accident proneness has enjoyed more popularity in 
the past than it does now, many projects have stressed its import-
ance as a factor to be taken into account in research. The second 
part of the chapter contained studies of accident repeaters, with 
particular attention to aspects such as control, aggression, per-
formance on psychomotor tasks, etc. 
2.1 Accident proneness 
The term "accident prone" had its origins ~n the work of 
Farmer and Chambers (1939) . They defined it as a personal idio-
syncrasy which predisposed its possessor to have accidents. The 
tendency manifested itself ~n all kinds of accidents under many 
different types of exposure. The term was very well accepted and 
led to the initiation of a number of research studies which att-
empted to discover whether in fact a "malign psychological quirk" 
such as accident proneness existed. Kolkman (1956) said that 
accident proneness: 
" ... is een atgemeen menseZijke eigensahap~ 
atleen de mate waarin zij voorkomt versahilt 
van mern3 to mens en wet zo~ dat zij in aUe 
gradaties voorkomt, van ontoelaatbaar hoog 
tot onmerkbaar taag. Bovendien is dese 
eignesahap bij een en diesetfde mens niet 
constant nie maar kan zij gedurende zijn 
Zeven varieren." (Kolkman, 1956, p. 54) 
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Dunbar (1955) claimed that a personality trait of accident 
proneness is a proven fact. She suggested that accident prone 
pers~ns were impulsive, looked for short-term gratifications 
rather than aiming at long-term goals, were resentful of authority 
and had shown childhood neurotic traits. She compared a group of 
fracture patients with cardiac patients, and divided accidents 
into two groups, viz., true accidents and personality-factor 
accidents. She claimed that 90% of the fracture patients had 
personality-factor accidents, compared with 12% of the cardiac 
patients, whereas 10% of each group had true accidents. 
Researchers have attempted different statistical methods to 
determine the validity of the idea of accident proneness. Three 
such methods were considered, viz., the percentage method; the 
~ 
method of comparison of accidents in two consecutive driving 
periods. 
2.1.1 The percentage method 
De Silva (1951) found that 3.9% of nearly 30,000 
drivers were responsible for 36.4% of the accidents over 
a six-year period. The Cambridge investigation (1953) 
gave a figure of 5% of 10,000 motorists as being responsi-
ble for 16.6% of the accidents over a seven-year period. 
Lejeune (1953) reported that 5% of motorists were 
responsible for 47% of the 10,000 accidents over a 
period of four years. 
It appeared from these researches that a small 
percentage of drivers were responsible for a large 
percentage of the accidents. However, on repetition 
of the researches, it was discovered that it was not 
the same group but others who caused the accidents. 
2.1.2 Method of comparison of chance with actual distributions 
If accidents were due entirely to chance, a 
chance or Poisson distribution would result. A 
distribution that does not fit would be evidence 
for the occurrence of accidents that were not due 
to chance. Both types of distribution have, how-
ever, been found by investigators . La Grange (1965) 
suggested that the reason for the discrepancies could 
be the influence of numerous factors other than 
supposed accident proneness. Such factors did not 
necessarily correlate with accident proneness in any 
way. 
2.1.3 Method of comparison of the number of accidents ~n two 
consecutive time periods 
Hakkinen (1958) studied the 4t000 accidents which 
occurred to 1,000 bus and train drivers in Helsinki 
over a period of eight years. He discovered that a 
comparison of the same drivers ~n two consecutive per-
iods of a year each, showed correlations of 0,25 and 
0,35; and in two consecutive periods of four years each, 
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the correlations were 0,60 and 0,70. His conclusion 
was that the occurrence of individual differences in 
accident frequency wa& not due to chance factors but 
could be ascribed to a constant personality factor, 
which could be named "accident proneness." 
2 . 1.4 Conclusions regarding accident proneness 
Walbeehm (1960) hinted that the term "accidt.!nt 
proneness" be accepted, but that at the same time the 
vFrious kinds of pronenes s be differentiated. Firstly, 
there was the relatively constant type of pronene~s as 
s~ggcsted by Hakkinen (1958). This proneness was 
charRcteristic of a specific t~ough smal l sample of 
drivers who regularly showed the t~ndency to be ln-
volved in accidents more than the average motorist. 
Secondly, a variable accident proneness was manifested 
by some motorists. For a time they showed a high in~ 
volvement in accidents and followed this with a period 
of hardly any accident involvement. They seemed to 
fluc tuate between two poles . Thirdly, there was an In-
cidental accident proneness wnere temporary factors 
contributed to cause accidents. Amongst these causal 
factors were fatigue, Jlcohu] , drugs, illness and worry. 
Schulzinger (1956) felt that some drivers were suscept-
ible to accidents particularly when they were under 
great mental anJ physical stress. Arbous and Kerrich 
(1951) indicated that pr,meness varied from time to 
time depending on the i ntens ity of envi ronmental strain. 
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Walbeehm (1960) did much to preserve the term at 
any cost, but, 1n fact, accident proneness has never 
been conclusively demonstrated. Coppin et a~. (1971) 
said that the accident proneness syndrome was inferred 
from the consequences of behaviour and then invoked as 
a causal explanation of the very behaviour it described. 
Eysenck (1971) has summarized the ideas on the concept 
of accident proneness as follows: 
"Accident proneness can be defined ir. many 
different ways~ and to deny its existence 
at one ~eve~ does not necessarily contradict 
someone e~se's affir.mation at another ~eve~. 
Thus. critics have often denied the existence 
of accident proneness in its widest meaning~ 
i . e .~ that some individua~s are more prone 
than others to a~~ types of accidents~ or in 
its rnost ~·.nclusivc form~ i . e ... all or mast 
accidents are due to a sma~~ group of peop~e. 
Both statements are so obvious~y wrong that 
one suspects they are just men of straw_, put 
up to gain a semantic victory by knocking 
them down .... a much more ~ike~y and wide~y 
accepted hypothesis u'Ould be that thos_e 
persona~ qua~ities related to accident prone-
ness are norma~~y distributed in the population_, 
with most peop~e being neither particu~arly 
prone to accidents~ nor particular~y safe_, but 
with a "tai~" of very safe drivers on one side 
and of very unsafe drivers on the other." 
(Eysenck , 1971, p. x) 
2.2 Acciden t repeaters 
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It has been maintained that more would be learned about the 
role of human factors in accident causation by concentration on 
specific causes in repeated accidents. The term "accident r epeater" 
came into being, simply as a person who has had repeated accidents . 
McFarland c t a~. (1955) and Suchman & Scherzer (1960) suggested that 
accident prone persons in fact may comprise a limited portion 
of any group of accident repeaters. 
Tillman & Hobbs (1949) made an intensive study of acc1-
dent repeater taxi drivers and compared the frequency of their 
personal and social maladjustments with taxi drivers who were 
free of accidents . The groups had been matched for driving 
experience and area of exposure. They also investigated the 
extent to which the drivers were known to agencies such as 
credit collection, social welfare, public health clinics and 
law courts . The significant differences which they obtained, 
led them to the conclusion that the accident repeaters reflect-
ed in their driving, their quality of adjustment to the environ-
ment and their way of living. 
Shaw (1965) set herself the task of selecting the safest 
and best African drivers by means of psychological testing. 
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Her first efforts included tests on reaction time, intelligence, 
sensori-motor and aptitude tests. These tests did not show any 
significant differences between good drivers and accident repeat-
ers. The inclusion, however, in the battery of a revised form 
of the Thematic Appreception Test gave an overall improvement of 
40% in the quality of the newly selected drivers. 
Both the above studies have achieved wide acclaim as 
indicative of the role of personality factors in accident repet-
ition. Many other researches, some of which have been quoted on 
the following pages have a similar goal. 
10 
One of the aims of the study by Selzer et al. (1967) was to 
determine the degree of correlation between traffic accidents and 
31 psychopathological variables. Persons who showed paranoid 
thinking revealed the highest correlation. Paranoid thinking 1n 
their case was often the precursor of angry and impulsive actions. 
The authors felt that the three variables, i.e., low frustration 
tolerance, recurrent rage or resentment and destructive or aggress-
ive behaviour, were so commonplace as to be almost socially accept-
able. The variables indicative of preoccupation with fantasy and 
obsessional rumination suggested the reduction in the awareness of 
the driver of external events. Marked affective lability also 
showed a significant correlation with accident repeaters . 
Conger (1957) combined the clinical and experimental approach 
and found that his accident repeater group were excessively self-
centred and indifferent to the rights of others, or excessively 
socio-centric. They were intensely preoccupied with fantasy satis-
factions or extremely stimulus-bound; more fearful of loss of love 
and support; and generally less able to tolerate tension without 
discharging it immediately. 
Marcus et al. (1964), in their study of accident repetition 
1n children suggested that adaptation, a complex phenomenbn, was 
dependent on many different aspects, such as perception, judgement, 
etc . The child made his adaptation in both a progressive and a 
regressive way, with the latter not necessarily being unhealthy. 
Tension levels in the child diminished his reality adaptation. 
Furthermore the excitability of the child's neuro-muscular system 
varied with congenital, maturational and environmental factors. 
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Where a child could not establish closeness with his parent he 
began to rely more and more on kinesthetic identification and 
various mo t or activi ties . Hyperactive motor discharge was neces-
sary for the re-establishment of equilibrium. The authors felt 
that the delay of immediate motor discharge by the interposition 
of thought defended the individual from potential damage. In 
t hi s connection i t was noted that Singer et al. (1956) said that 
Freud in 1900 had suggested a theoretical linkage of delay and 
thought development. They felt that this relationship became the 
pivotal feature of his concept of the reality principle. Their 
study centred around the Rorschach determinant M as a measure of 
the capacity to delay . Many M responses indicated much motor 
inhibition . They also indicated that lack of perceptual control 
went hand i n hand wi th the inability to restrain motor behaviour. 
Marcus et al. (1964) also interested themselves in the shad-
1ng responses of the Rorschach. They suggested that the children 
who had many accidents were clearly distinguished from the others 
in their use of dark shading. Generally the authors concluded 
that the accident repeaters showed more anxiety and emotional dis-
turbance; produced more dysphoric content; showed more regression 
adaptive measures; and also showed a diminished perceptual field. 
Quenalt (1972) gave two groups of SO car drivers a picture 
test, the Shipley Abstraction test as well as the Maudsley Person-
ality Inventory . The subjects drove in their own cars around a 
12-mile route under normal traffic conditions, accompanied by two 
observers who tape-recorded as they drove, certain observations 
of the driving behaviour of the subjects, on the basia of four 
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drive indices, viz., the frequency of occurrence of usual manoeu-
vres; the frequency of occurrence of near accidents; the ratio of 
rear-view mirror usage to manoeuvres; and the ratio of overtaking 
to being overtaken . On the basis of these indices four sub-groups 
were set up, namely, safe, injudicious, dissociated active and dis-
sociated passive. The word "dissociated" was used to identify those 
drivers who appeared to drive with an awareness of stimuli which is 
below that necessary for safe driving. The dissociated drivers lack-
ed anticipation, and showed poor judgement in the traffic situations. 
They lacked a feeling for the consequences of their own actions. 
When near accidents occurred, they were far less emotionally affected 
by the event than th4 observers. 
Conger P.t al . (1959) found that accident repeaters demonstrated 
impuls ive hostility, poor reality testing, emotional lability, impair-
ed intellectual function, idiosyncratic fantasy life, and withdrawal 
from interpersonal relationships. 
Numerous studies have noted the aggressive tendencies of acci-
dent repeaters. Parry (1968) said that there was a tendency for 
high aggression, whether or not in combination with high anxiety to 
make for greater liability to accidents. 
Selling (1941) found that accident repeaters failed to antici-
pate risks, were often young and drove aggressively. Raphael (1967) 
recounted that often aggression overflowed and became manifest in 
fisticuffs between drivers involved in accidents. Lorenz (1966) 
quoted Margolin's work with the Ute Indians, who were renowned for 
their fight in'g qualities. The rates for motor-vehicle accidents 
of these people far exceeded those of any other racial group. 
Anti-soc ial attitudes amongst accident repeaters were also 
suggested by Alonso-Fernandez (1966) and Pelaz (1966). 
Whitlock (1971) has made the following remarks about 
aggress~ve accident repeaters: 
"'J';,e. per;;onal-~ty s tr!~~L.!Al'e of Utv•~e e-mvi c: t .. ui 
of crimes of violence w1~Zl often show features 
of aggressive psyc~opathy . Th0 association of 
this class of personality with excessive drink-
ing> paranoid ideation> hostile attitudes to-
ward::. authority> and suicidal tendene1:es> seems 
at times to be expressed with devastating conse-
quences on thP public highway. The problem of 
the accident t'epeater and the violator of traf-
fic regulat ions rr.ay in part be due to the agg-
ressive behat~io;.tr of f:i,,; r::ychopath on the 
roads . " 
(Whitlock, 1971, p. 50) 
Raux and Erl ciOk (1966) said that the most importand differ-
ence between accident repeaters and non-accident subjects with 
regard to hand and eye co-ordindtion tests \<lc.s the fact t hat non-
accident subject worked more speedily. During 1961 Maruyama and 
Kitamura (19Gl) tested 68 bus drivers hy mPnns of a speed antici-
pation test. The testees were instructed to anticipate the time 
a light patch would require to pass through a black wall. The 
light patch glided at a constant speed along a horizontal ditch 
on a gray screen across t he testec's line of vision from left to 
righ t and then vanished behind the black wal l. There was a mark-
ed difference between the mean anticipation time of a group of 
accident free and accident repeater drivers . Nagats uka and 
Kitamura (1961) did a t es t called The Discriminative Reaction 
Test uf Multiple Performance on t he same testees used i n the 
previously quoted experiment. The test was concerned with the 
co-ordinative function of perception and motor reaction. The 
accident repeater group made more errors than the accident free 
group. In a test battery which included a complex psychomotor 
co-ordination task, Andersson et aZ. (1970) found that accident-
loaded drivers showed an extreme dependence on external factors 
and could be regarded as extraceptive perceivers. They had very 
weak inner control of behaviour. Their behaviour resembled that 
which characterized the early stages of the development of the 
individual, where there was still poor differentiation between 
perception and action. 
Hakkinen (1958) used a battery of tests for the detection 
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of various levels of accident proneness . The battery included 
intelligence and mechanical aptitude; simple motor speed and co-
ordination; choice reaction time; a driving apparatus test; psycho-
motor personality function tests; and also a questionnaire and 
interview. An intercorrelation between the variables of the many 
tests and the accident criterion, followed by a factor analysis 
of the correlations showed that the tests were covering six major 
areas, v~z ., attention, involuntary control of motor function, 
stability of behaviour, co-ordination, simple reaction time and 
intelligence. Attention or the ability when confronted with a 
sudden stimulus, to quickly choose and perform the correct respon-
se, had the highest loading on the accident criterion. This was 
a conscious and voluntary ability . The second highest loading or 
involuntary control of motor functions was associated with hasti-
ness, distractability and motor restlessness and was an unconscious 
function. Stability and adaptability of behaviour showed relative-
ly high loadings; co-ordination, lesser loading and finally reaction 
time and intelligence showed no association with the accident 
criterion at all. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ACCIDENT REPEATER 
3. 1 Orientation of the present study 
One of the recommendations made by van Kerken (1969) on his 
return from a study tour overseas in connection with traffic safe-
ty was that : 
" ... a direct study be made of human 
thought processes in order to discover 
the rationality of the thinking of the 
driver. " (van Kerken, 1969, p . 48) 
The present study, during the incubation of the problem, 
was concerned with the idea that the rationality or irrationality 
of the thought processes of the driver influenced his behaviour 
on the road. van Kerken also suggested that the discovery of the 
rationality of thought was second in importance only to the dis-
cover y of the unconscious. Such statements were associated by 
the writer with the ego-id polarities or the ego-id autonomies of 
ego psychology . The thinking of the human being differs from time 
to time as regards the extent of rationality. Even the most 
matur e person could be somewhat unreasonable on occasion , depend-
ing on t he situation in which he finds himself . Generally , how-
ever, his mode of behaviour is rational. In other cases, those of 
poet o r arti st , for instance , some irrat ionality could be i nvoked 
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though the inqividual was mostly involved with rational thinking . 
Researchers have considered that this controlled irrationality 
was, in fact, associated with creativity . Controlled irrational-
ity was then a special phenomenon. Usually the irrationality of 
thinking is controlled by the ego strength of the person. The 
ego strength of the individual determined the extent of his adapt-
ability or ability to cope with reality, as well as the extent to 
which he could regress in service of the ego . Where there was very 
weak control or ego strength, the irrational thought processes 
would appear to gain the upper hand until, as was seen in the case 
of the schizophrenia irrationality, became predominant. 
By virtue of the fact that perception was an integral aspect 
of thinking, the perception of an object by a person was also col-
oured with rationality or irrationality depending to the ego stren-
gth of the person. A personal perceptive sequence occurred to the 
writer which is repeated here to illustrate what prompted further 
thinking about the project. 
The writer was travelling by car down a relatively steep 
hill and wished to apply brakes to slow the vehicle down. On 
application of brakes · there was no result, and the pedal lodged 
against the floor of the car. The expected result, namely slowing 
the vehicle down had not been forthcoming. There had to be aome 
different action to stop the car and this depended on the quick 
thinking of the driver. 
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The lack of brakes resulted in a negative input of inform-
ation and a mental regulation had to be made. The question that 
occurred to the writer was whether all drivers made equally eff-
ective regulation; when results were not as expected; whether 
archaic material or irrationality filled the mind during the 
absence of feedback; and finally,whether the archaic material was 
of the same degree for all drivers. 
How could a person discover something about the thinking of 
a driver who did not make the most effective regulation? Could 
the Rorschach be an instrument to be used to discover this? The 
Rorschach itself, represented a somewhat similar situation ~n that 
the sensory elements of perception were minimized, during the 
administration of the test and imaginal elements were brought to 
the fore. 
The preliminary thinking about the research could then be 
summarized as follows; A driver,at the time of minimized or nega-
tive feedback,could make an adequate reaction depending on the ex-
tent that his thinking was rational. 
3.2 Consideration of aspects of ego psychology 
Lindzey (1958) pointed out that any attempt to assess 
behaviour must give consideration to cognitive factors or ego 
processes. Different individuals in the same situation will 
behave quite differently depending on the way in which they 
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control or direct their thinking and therefore the expression of 
their drives. The following chapter was devoted to an understand-
ing of different aspects of ego psychology and relationships dis-
cernible between ego psychology and the concept of feedback. In 
the first place, serving as an introduction were some important 
contributions in the development of ego psychology as well as a 
description of structure and function in ego psychology . A des-
cription of the primary process function followed with considerat-
ion given to aspects of secondary process thinking as being at the 
opposite pole. The theme of the research that the amount of feed-
back also indicated the amount of secondary process thinking pre-
ceded a review of the different types of feedback. 
3. 2 . 1 Important contributions to the study of ego psychology 
(a) Freud 
Early in Freud's writings the ego was no more 
than an independent agent of external reality or an 
organ of the self-preservation instinct . As such it 
had independent instinctual energy and was innately 
antagonistic to the drives. With the introduction 
of the concept of narc1s1sm, Freud came to see the 
ego as a libidinal object and self-preservation as 
a libidinal motive. The ego was no longer antagon-
istic to the lib i do but in league with it. Freud 
still, however, retained the idea of the independent 
status of the ego. In 1915 he began to see aggress-
10n as a property of the ego. The aggression was 
expressed when the ego was threatened. The appear-
ance of self-destructive impulses soon persuaded him, 
however, that aggression was not basically ego-prot-
ective. By 1923 he had given up the idea of an inde-
pendent reality ego. In doing so, however, he was 
concerned that the id again became the stronger force. 
Right to the time of his New Introductory Lectures 
(1933), the ego was still in the service of the id 
though its better knowledge of reality and its con-
trol of the pathways of attention, memory and action 
did allow it a measure of action . His final assum-
ption was that ideally the ego and the id are indis-
tinguishable and that their aims coincide without 
there being any concession from either system. 
(b) Hartmann 
Spitz (1957) speaks of the contribution of 
Hartmann as being the next major advance in psycho-
analysis. Whereas Freud had systematized the know-
ledge of the unconscious, it was Hartmann who broug-
ht system into the fragmentary aspects of the ego. 
In contrast with the idea of Freud, that the id is 
older than the ego, he suggested that both the ego 
and id differentiate out of the matri x of animal 
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instinct. The instincts of the animal find their equ1-
valent 1n the ego and drive functions of man. Inherit-
ed ego characteristics and the complex interaction of 
instinctual drives and outer reality both play a part 
in the development of the ego. The inherited ego char-
acteristics, or inborn apparatuses of ego autonomy, in-
clude perception , intention, object comprehension, think-
ing, language, recall phenomena, productivity, motor 
development, maturation, and the learning process. He 
enlarged on the original concept of drive by giving a 
more central role to aggression. The aggressive energy 
participates in the development of psychic structure, 
and when these structures are well formed they provide 
aggre ss i ve energy with modes of expression. Whilst the 
id was usually thought of as being stubbornly opposed 
t o change, and the ego as being flexible and able to 
learn , Hartmann (1952) indicated that changes in the 
id can be brought about by maturational development of 
the drives . Sometimes the ego helps to provide change 
in the id by draining or damming up instinctual energy. 
When factors occur which increase drive autonomy, ego 
autonomy decreases accordingly. Hartmann suggested 1n 
Rational and Irrational Action (1947) that ego and 
drive autonomies are basic to many branches of sc1ence. 
He made the remark that psychoanalysis might one day 
add a theory based upon the knowledge of the structural 
aspects of personality and its motivations. Hartmann 
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maintained that anticipation and delay of gratification 
were important aspects in human action. Action is an 
ego function which promotes adaptation to reality, es-
pecially to the extent that it ~s rational action. 
Spitz (1957) correctly alluded to the work of Hartmann 
as emphasizing those processes through which the species 
achieves the dignity of the human being . His pointers 
to the future,particularly in terms of theory of action 
and adaptation are significant for this study . . 
(c) Rapaport 
Rapaport (1951) recognized the id forces as well 
as the ego organization which ~s pitted against them. 
The autonomous ego structures are responsible for every-
day behaviour which shows consistency, reliability, and 
r e lative lack of intensity, whilst the id forces insti-
gate abandon and wilfulness. Rapaport (1959) also 
referred to the aspects of behaviour that are delayable, 
bring about delay or are themselves products of delay . 
This delay does not just mean the lapse of time between 
impulse and action but a long circuiting of impulse so 
that the impulse is brought ·into harmony with realistic 
considerations. The unconsc~ous impulse is constrained 
from discharge in order to allow for the appropriate 
understanding of and reaction to the reality situation. 
For Rapaport achievement of maturity comes via ego 
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independence and cognitive control or delay of impulse, 
but at the same time man is protected from slavery to 
environmental stimuli, by the fact that he has endogen-
ous drives. Rapaport (1960) explained that id drives are 
created by visceral hungers which stimulate the nervous 
system to carry out comsummatory activity until sati-
ation is reached. In its turn, the insistence of the 
real world helps to protect the person against these 
inner instinctual pressures. He explained this reci-
procal relationship in the following way: 
"Since reality relations guarantee auto-
~wmy from the id., excessive autonomy from 
the environment must impair the autonomy 
f rom the id; and since drives are thn 
ultimate guarantees of autonomy from the 
rnvironment, an excBssive autonomy from 
the id must impair the autonomy from the 
environment." (Rapaport, 1958, p. 24) 
He carried on this line of argument and made 
the point that maintenance of autonomy in relation 
to the id or to the environment depends on input 
from the environment or from within the psychic 
apparatus . He called this input "stimulus-nutri-
ment", adapting the term from Piaget's idea of 
aliment. He mai ntained that the structures are 
dependent upon such nutriment or stimulati on for 
the ir stability . 
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(d) E:r:ikson 
Erikson did not find inevitable opposition 
between ego and id, nor did he make any strong app-
eal to ego autonomy 1 (Rapaport (1956) suggested 
that Erikson's "organ modes" are examples of auto-
nomous ego functions ac.d also that estrangement of 
the modes from the zones of origin are parallels to 
cgo-id differentiation . ) He consistently transcend-
ed distinction between ego and drive. Where to 
Hartmann, for instance, the drive fragments or break-
down of instinctual patterns is blind and wilful, to 
Eriks0n these fragments i n themselves are synthesis-
seeking. He does not feel that ego functions should 
be i ndependent of the emotions and thus completely 
nechanically accurate. 
(e) Beres 
Beres (1972) wrote that the child was born 
with the potential to develop ego, id and superego 
functions. Some of the ego functions have originated 
from identifications with the parents and from con-
flict situations. They achieve a degree of independ-
ence and maintain stability in later conflict situ-
ations . Other of the ego functions lose their auto-
nomy and regress to an earlier functional state . 
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rleres does not accept the idea of absolute autonomy at 
any stage of life and suggested that normal psychic 
fun ctioning includes the capacity to use defensive 
measures in time of stress. The concept "regression 
in service of the ego" was explained by Beres as a 
transient loss of autonomy. In more traumatic exper-
iences it might take years before an autonomy is re-
stored. He mentioned too that there is the possibi-
lity that ego funct ions could have a definit~ instinct-
ual component. This instinctua l component can co-
operate without conflict in a ego-autonomous way. 
l:_2_. 2_· _Structure and f unc tion in ego psychology 
The content of the mind is limitless and end-
lessly varied . Content may be stared by different 
individual s for different reasons ~nd it may fluctu-
a te markedly within a single individual over time . 
In contrast to content, structure 1s limited to a 
certa i n number of genotypic terms. Structures should 
have some different implications for behaviour to 
simple content properties . Psychoanalytic study 1s 
based on the clinical observation of conflict in hum-
an mental activity. Such conflict presupposed oppos-
ing systems or organizations which embody the con-
flicting forces. Whereas initially his theory sugg-
ested t hat the conflict was between the unconsc1ous 
and preconscious system, latterly Freud changed this . 
He said : 
"We shaZZ. have to substitute for this 
antithesis another, taken from our 
i nsight into the structural conditions 
of t he mind - the antithesis between 
the coherent ego and the repressed 
which is split off from it." (Freud, 
1923, p. 17) 
J ust as Freud changed his v~ews of the s truct-
ure o f the mind, so other psychologists have not been 
ab l e t o agree, as to the need for structure. Hartmann 
(19 59 ) summarized the implications of structural theory 
a s the recognition of the relevant difference s between 
in!:>r i rt<tual tendencies which strive for discharge and 
other t enden c ies that enforce postponement of discharge 
and are modifiable by the influence of the environment. 
Bieri et at. (1960) have indicated that the mor e 
c omp lE' x the structure the more differentiated it is. 
\.Jithin t h e complexity are the primary and secondary 
process thinking functions. They follow very closely 
the demarcation of ego and id though Gill (1963) has 
hin t ed that certain primary process functioning has 
been attributed to the ego. Kris, (1935) suggested, 
~n a different way, that the ego retains control over 
s ome pr~mary process thinking as, for example , in wit 
and c reat i vity . The whole process of adaptation 1s 
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very complex and there might be continuous organization 
and reorganization of mental process. 
3.2.3 The development of the primary process function 
Freud introduced the term "primary process 1.n 
his Project for a Scientific Psychology, prepared in 
1893, but not published unti l after his death along 
with his letters to Fliess (1954). The section 1.n 
the Project is entitled "Primary process; Sleep and 
Dreams". He next discussed the pr1.mary process in 
the Interpretation of Dreams in the section entitled 
"The Primary and Secondary Process: Repression". 
(1900) . He briefly returned to the idea of primary and 
secondary process from time to time, the most import-
ant single paper being "Formulations of the Two Princi-
ples of Mental Functioning" (1911). The general idea 
given by Freud in these papers was that the primary 
process function was a primitive one, working very 
directly according to the pleasure principle. Prim-
ary process thinking manifested itself in impulsive 
and random action; this being that type of action 
that did not take into account means or reason. It 
was action that could easily be accompanied by uncon-
trolled and violent affect, or with compulsive ritual. 
Shafer (1958) suggested: 
"The primary process which is genetically 
and formally the more primiti ve3 operates 
wi t h unneutralized drive energi es, and 
its regulative principle is tension re-
duction; it strives toward the immediate 
discharge of energy accumulations by a 
direct route and through the mechanisms 
of dispZaaement3 condensation3 substitute 
formation and symbo Zization. 11 
(Shafer, 1958, p. J23) 
Though the average reader of psychoanalysis 
does not affix very great importance to the concept, 
an authority no less than Jones (1953) regards the 
primary and secondary process concept as Freud's 
most important claim to fame . 
Milner (1958) indicated that apart from the 
mention , as shown above, of the pr imary process, 
there has been little further exploration of the 
formal organization of the unconscious . It was not 
until fairly recently that there has been any desire 
to elaborate on this concept. Arlow (1958) proposed 
that the restricted definition of the primary process 
be abandoned, and that there be further study i nto 
the concept so that it might have more practical worth 
in the applic&tion of psychoanalytic theory . 
Equivalent to the short-lived thinking in con-
nection with the primary process, was the postponement 
of elaboration by Freud of the concept of the second-
ary process. Secondary process thought function was 
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considered as standing in contradistinction to the un-
bounded and undirected mobility of the primary process 
function. It arranged for ordered thought, controlled 
effeGt, and goal-directed behaviour. The rationality 
of the secondary process was more economical with re-
gard to psychic energy when compared with the high inten-
sity discharge of the primary process. Koch (1959) re-
corded the following of the secondary process: 
" ... the structures., by ra1.-s1.-ng the discharge 
thresholds of drive energies., and by build-
ing new controlling dams., obstruct the tend-
ency toward direct discharge., enforce delay 
and detour., and thus give rise to derivat-
ive motivations whose tendency toward immedi-
ate and direct discharge is decreased." 
(Koch, 1959, p. 127) 
Klein (1954), Holt (1956), and Noy (1969) have 
continued the study of primary and secondary process 
thinking. Whilst Freud had regarded primary and 
secondary process functions as two different kinds of 
mental functions belonging to two different systems, 
viz,, conscious and unconscious, Klein (1961) wrote 
that the two levels of primary and secondary organ1-
zation are only two extremes of a continuum which 
follows from the inhibition to the disinhibition of 
mental functions. Holt (1956) specified that pure 
primary process thinking or pure secondary process 
thinking did not exist as such. His scoring cate-
gories in his measures for primary process thinking 
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were, for instance, at a level 1 and level 2 for primary 
process, where level 2 implied that the level 2 response 
was more in the direction of socialized thinking. 
There is nothing in the classical approach to 
suggest that there was any form of development in the 
primary process function. Freud assumed that the prim-
ary process thought operated until superseded by second-
ary process thought. Primary process thinking was re-
garded as discontinuous and became less evident as the 
person developed. Where Kris (1952) used the concept 
"regression in service of the ego" he presupposed a 
situation where the strong and healthy ego reached 
into the deeper more primiti~e layers of the unconsci-
ous to obtain a greater originality of response. As 
this might occur at any time in the life of the person, 
primary process thinking always remained. Holt (1967) 
assumed a development in primary process thinking by 
the same experience~ and by the growth of the same 
structures that produce successive versions of the 
secondary process. 
Noy (1969) illustrated the development of the 
primary process function, firstly, by saying that the 
dream material of the three-year-old is of a differ-
ent nature to that of the adult; and secondly, that 
the concratinizations of the schizophrenic show a 
higher level of thinking with increasing age. 
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Both Klein (1958) and Noy (1969) referred to 
the Piag~tian views of thinking. In the consider-
ation of behaviour as development, there is corro-
boration between the drive aims and accommodation. 
They agreed that the sucking reflex or the active 
sucking schema is entirely subjective. There is no 
existence in its own right of an object that 1s con-
nected with sucking. Freud (1950) indicated that 
the child's first erotic object is the breast "of the 
mother, and love in its very beginnings attaches -it-
self to the satisfaction of the need for food. 
Piaget (1952) propounded the idea that psychological 
reality in the beginning of life is the product of 
simple actions and their feedback. Abstract think~ 
ing slowly develops from the earliest sensori-motor 
activity. Noy (1969) suggested that these first 
experimental units or schemata are the first cogniti-
ve units which later develop and unite to create the 
"self" as an enti,ty which is separate from the environ-
ment. He suggested that the first schemata might be 
given the name of "se lf-nuclei" and he defined the pri-
mary processes as functions which assimilate any new 
experiences into the framework of the gradually develop-
ing self. Primary process thought was the initial 
attempts of the immature infant to organize his per-
ceptual world . 
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The primary process model is very important at 
this stage for the establishment of a self behaving 
according to tension-reduction and various defences 
are set up against the intrusion of too much reality. 
Elements of thought exist in a condensed or concentr-
ated form. Displacement occurs where one though ele-
ment can suffice for another . The third type of de-
fence, that of symbolism, was expalined by Fenichel 
as follows: 
"Primitive symbo Usm is a part of the way 
in which conceptions are formed in pre-
logical thinking: comprehension of the 
world radiates from instinctual demands 
and fears so that the first objects are 
possible means of gratification or possi-
ble threats; stimuli that provoke the 
same reactions are looked upon as identi-
cal; and the first ideas are not sums built 
up out of identical elements~ but wholes 
comprehended in a stiZZ undifferentiated 
way~ united by the emotional responses they 
have provoked." (Fenichel, 1946, p. 48) 
The inner maturational aspects of the individual 
and the influence of his environment begin to demand 
firstly that self-directed pleasurable activities be 
delayed or discarded. Accordingly room is made for a 
consideration of reality and for communication with 
other human beings. Outer reality is recognised to 
the degree that the inner representation of body 
schemata are perceived as being different from the 
outer objects. Secondary process thinking is given 
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impetus when the meaning of the object lies not only 
in its function, its appearance or its utility to the 
subject, but also to "mastery" of the object. In 
other words a double stage is reached. There 1s an 
encounter with reality and with it a working-through 
in a logical manner of the reality. In this way con-
cepts are formed which are bound by time, space, and 
logic . Noy (1969) said that the primary process knows 
no such language of time and logic. 
3.2.4 Feedback as a criterion for secondary process thinking 
Rapaport (1967) wrote: 
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••• aU thought forms involve both primary 
and secondary process but differ from each 
other in the kind of ~ynthetic function 
they involve, that is to say, they differ 
in the degree of dominance the secondary 
process achieves over the prirzary. 11 
(Rapaport, 1967, p. 843) 
Every person has his own pattern of thought 
process organization which is a combination of some 
primary process thinking which uses visual and other 
sensual images, and conceptual, abstract thinking which 
makes use of linguistic signals, symbols and signs for 
mental operations. The extent to which each is includ-
ed depends on various environmental and motivational 
factors. Weisberg and Springer (1961) found for 
33 
instance, that creative children were raised in fami-
lies which tolerated illogical communication signifi-
cantly more than did control families. Their work 
assumed that creativity involved the use of more prim-
ary process thinking . than non-creativity. 
Wynne and Singer (1963) recorded that parents 
who were not able to respond to logical communication 
because of their psychopathology, have childre.n, who 
have learnt that logical thought processes were not 
efficient for dealing with their parents, and had then 
to adopt other forms of communication to reach them. 
The non-logical noises, that a father would make to 
his child to convey to the child the concept of a 
train, would be an equivalent analogy. In this case, 
there is an appeal to the experiencing of the "thing" 
meaning or representation rather than to the "word" 
representation . The use of the word "train" would 
indicate ·conceptual thinking or secondary process 
thinking. Piaget (1937) considered that clear inner 
representation of the object became apparent at the 
age of sixteen months. When the ability to discrim-
inate between inner and outer information, or between 
the self and reality comes about, then feedback can 
take place . 
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Noy (1969) wrote that feedback was: 
" .•. a mechanism which involves perception 
of stimuli stei'TJTting from one's OUJn funct-
ioning." (Noy, 1969, p. 170) 
Both feedback and secondary process occur consciously. 
He took walking and talking as examples of conscious 
functions and suggested that perceptual feedback infor-
mation called the attention of the consciousn~ss to 
something like a stumble of the feet or a slip of the 
tongue~ The recognition that something had gone wrong, 
caused an attempt at immediate restoration. Noy (1969) 
further defined feedback as: 
" .. . the continuous infiOUJ of perceptual 
information stemming from all the ele-
ments involved in a given function~ or 
from special receptors located in a 
given system to provide this inform-
ation (for instance~ the carotid sinus 
in the cardiovascular system). This 
information serves to monitor and 
regulate the given function. " (Noy, 
1969, p. 163) 
He explained that in many somatic functions the moni-
toring is done automatically with the aid of basic or 
conditioned reflexes, whilst in the higher mental fun-
ction it is done with the aid of awareness or calling 
the attention of the consciousness where it is nece-
ssary. Klein (1958) indicated that feedback was sig-
nificant because it co-ordinated the phases of perce-
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ptual-cognitive-motor action and reaction with drive 
aims on the one hand, and with the environmental stru-
ctures and probabilities on the other hand. Troland 
(1932) spoke of concept of "retroflex" which involved 
a back action of the environment on the cortex. He 
said that changes of behaviour provoked by contact 
with segments of reality are themselves perceived, and 
the consequences of the contact can be reported back 
to the cortex in terms of benefit or injury, leading 
to reinforcement. facilitation or inhibition of the 
behaviour change. 
The secondary processes have been regarded as 
the thought function that develops in relation to 
reality. The secondary processes also depend for 
their maintenance on reality contact. Goldberger 
(1961) concluded that: 
" ... the psychic structures underlying the 
operation of logical~ reality-orientated 
thought require continual sensory contact 
with the order and patterning of the real 
world~ which the thought process is epis-
temologically assumed to reflect. In the 
absence of such contact~ the psychic stru-
ctures lose their stability and drive-con-
trolling capacity~ with the result that 
regression to the primitive, archaic~ prim-
ary process mode of fUnctioning is facili-
tated." (Goldberger. 1961, p. 289) 
Noy (1969) also considered the role of the 
primary process thinking in connection with feed-
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back. He suggested that in many situations primary 
process thinking is not really unconscious, but part-
ially conscious, or at least their product is consci-
ous. He categorized primary process thinking into 
four different categories. In the first the subject 
is unaware of his behaviour and of the process that 
determines it. A trained observer would recognize 
that such product-process unconsciousness is found 
in the behaviour of a neurotic or psychotic. In the 
s econd, as in the case of the remembered dream, the 
process in unconscious, but the product conscious. 
In the third, as in the slip of the .tongue, process 
is ex post faoto conscious and product is conscious. 
In the fourth, as in the case of jester or poet, 
both process and product are conscious and controlled. 
Consciousness is the means of regulating the primary 
process in terms of reality. The author pointed out 
that ~n the case of primary process thinking, feed-
back served to prevent such processes from hindering 
reality-oriented thinking, or integrated them into 
reality-oriented thinking. 
3.3 A review of the concept of feedback 
The simplest explanation of the idea of feedback was 
given by Bilodeau & Bilodeau (1962). They called it the know-
ledge of results and suggested that to know what one has done 
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was easily the most important variable which controls learning 
and performance. In an experiment (1960) they showed that there 
was no improvement in performance without some knowledge of re-
sults; that there is progressive improvement with knowledge of 
results; and deterioration after withdrawal of knowledge of 
results . Conklin (1959) showed that performance was seriously 
disrupted or made impossible by lags in feedback of even one 
second or less. Annnons (1956) suggested that the word "feedback" 
has posed problems, and that it has been used in mapy different 
contexts. The different ways in which feedback might occur, have 
been described below. 
3 . 3.1 Serial chain feedback 
Greenwald (1970) gave the following example of 
feedback as it exi sts in the performance of a routi n-
ized series of responses. In a musical melody , the 
first performance is usually guided by si t uational 
cues such as t he written notes of the melody. As the 
performance becomes more reliable, playing a note is 
consistently preceded not only by perception of these 
situational stimuli to which the performance is already 
conditioned, but also by the reception of stimuli pro-
duced by the performance of the preceding series of 
notes , or in fact by the sensory feedback . These latt-
er stimuli could be auditory , visual or proprioceptive 
1n different types of situations. Whatever their form, 
first there was a tendency to overshoot, and when the 
light was moved back to ten degrees, there was a ten-
dency to undershoot the mark. In Pew's (1966) experi-
ment, subjects attempted to keep an oscilloscope target 
centred on cross hairs by sequentially pressing two keys, 
one of which caused target acceleration to the right and 
and the other to the left. 
After much practice, the best subjects were mak-
ing a~proximately four or five responses per second. 
Although the rate of responding was close to the limits 
for processing visual feedback, the pattern of respond-
ing suggested that rather than modifying each response 
on the basis of feedback, the subjects were modifying a 
motor pr ogramme. It was noticed in these experiments 
that movement control was internalized and it was quite 
possible that for short periods of time there was free-
dom from visual control. Kinesthetic feedback was main-
tained throughout. 
3.3.3 Ideo-motor mechanisms 
Mowrer (1960) pointed out that William James (1890) 
an.ticipated present-day developments on feedback. In a 
chapter about "Will" James suggested that sensory feed-
back from action was essential to the continuation of 
such action, and even the initiation of such action. 
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The principle underlying the ideo-motor mechanism 
was that the image of the movement was active prior to 
the performance of the movement. Images of imminent 
movements had been built up during the myriads of learn-
ing experiences through life. The child, for instance, 
spent many hours viewing the movements of his hands, 
hearing the sound of his voice, etc . As life proceeds 
novel input might provide for more flexibility of per-
formance or for the planning of ~ response. Greenwald 
(1970) suggested that the ideo-motor mechanism assumes 
that responses are represented in the form of images of 
their consequences. 
There are different bases of evidence for the 
ideo-motor system. Luria (1961) in his work on develop-
mental investigations of voluntary regulation of perform-
ance, found that the child developed increasing verbal 
control between the response image and overt performance. 
At three years of age, for instance, with repeated 
instructions, a child can squeeze a ball on the present-
ation of a red light and inhibit squeezing on the pre-
sentation of a green light. At the age of five, he 
becomes able to use his own speech t o inhibit responding, 
as well as to regulate performance at a variety of 
other complex tasks. Max (1937) found correlations 
between the thoughts of movements and the electromyo-
gram recordings of movements of the effectors. 
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Greenwald (1970) indicated that the ideo-motor 
system dealt with symbolic mediational processes and 
not with a di rect linkage of response to stimulus . It 
was therefore not a rigid system with one-to-one re-
lationships . Such a system would be adaptable enough 
to account for the role of ideational processes, at 
the response image, or the most abstract levels in 
planning of novel action sequences. 
3.3 . 4 Orienting responses 
Sokolov (1958) and Berlyne (1970) have given 
prominence to "internal mediating responses" which 
tney have called "orienting responses". The orient-
ing responses produced changes in the body which 
could not be detected without special i nstruments . 
The orienting ·responses appeared to increase the 
capacity to obtain feedback from the environment . 
When such an orienting response came into action, it 
was accompanied by increases in the sensitivity of 
the sensory equipment as a whole, and it also pre-
pared the organism to act more rapidly and vigorous-
ly . Zaporozhets (1970) indicated that feedback is 
most important in voluntary behaviour . He said that 
there is a difference in the amount of feedback that 
occurs in primitive behaviour and complex behaviour. 
In primitive behaviour some feedback is obtained at 
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the end of the behaviour pattern. With complex be-
haviour, there is a continuous monitoring of the 
behaviour and visual, auditory and proprioceptive 
stimuli are used throughout. The greater the amou-
nt of feedback the more flexible the behaviour. 
3.3.5 Feedback and ego psychology 
Ego psychology presupposed an active organism 
with many incoming stimuli pressing for change in. 
activity. Klein (1969) wrote that at the moment of 
the occurrence of the incoming stimuli an area of 
imbalance existed at a particular event region of an 
ideomotor system. The excitation or the increase of 
excitation at such an area gave rise to a train of 
thought. The train of thought consisted of a struc-
ture within which a temporary extended series of 
events was linked at the recepti ve end vLa extero-
ceptors and visceroceptors to stimulation; at the 
motor end to affector and effector processes; and 
to each other by facilitative or inhib.itive signals 
in a patterned sequence. The area of imbalance is 
an internal regulator which sensitizes the person 
to stimuli and leads to information-producing 
actions. The imbalance gave rise to motivated 
behaviour which had as its purpose the inhibition 
of primary stimulation and the selection of feed-
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back from the environment of affective, ideational 
or action types which might lead to consummatory 
activity. 
3.3.6 Feedback delay 
Whether feedback be visual, auditory or kin-
esthetic, there is the possibility of a very small 
but finite interval from the time of the response 
to the time of the feedback. Feedback delay has . 
been noticed in life situations and it has also been 
simulated in experimental conditions. Tracking 1s 
one such situation. Tracking is the steering motion 
1n following something along a given path. To keep 
to a given target requires constant visual regula-
tion. Sensory feedback mechanisms prompt the oper-
ator as to his position on the target, and cause 
him to make the necessary adjustments. The intro-
duction of a delay in between the activity and the 
feedback tends to change the intrinsic organization 
of the motion pattern thereby permitting the entry 
of disconcerting effects. When a machine to be 
steered is too heavy for easy and direct manipulation 
by a human operator, a power system is sometimes in-
troduced to enable the operator to control the machine 
efficiently. Unless delay is reduced to a minimum, 
the tracking performance is affected adversely. The 
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driver of a big bus could easily be an individual who 
is mo~e than usually perturbed by feedback delay. 
3.3.7 Experimental findings involving feedback delay 
Smith (1962) has pointed out that remarkable 
consistencies have been noticed ~n experiments on 
delayed feedback. He said that a delay as small as 
a few hundredths of a second causes severe disturb-
ance or breakdown of normal movement integration 
with an accompaniment of emotional disturbance. 
Kalamus et aZ. (1960) found that duration of hand-
writing movements was approximately a linear funct-
~on of delay magnitude up to 0,5 second. In trac-
ing tasks, the magnitude of delay was more correlat-
ed with error scores than with movement duration. 
Subjects showed no learning effects during delay. 
Van Bergeijk & David (1959) found an i ncrease of 
neatness and error scores exponentially with incre-
asing delay intervals. Smith (1962) in a delayed 
pictorial feedback experiment found that the subjects 
displayed emotional disturbances with all delay inter-
vals. Accuracy of performance decreased. Smith et aZ. 
(1960) reported that in a second delayed pictorial 
feedback experiment that they found a marked slowing 
down of movement; blocking and disorganization; repe-
tition of movements; and changes in motion patterns. 
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The role of kinesthetic feedback as adjunct to 
visual feedback was also explored. Poulton (1952). 
showed that if subjects cloaed their eyes for a five 
second period while tracking a sixty cycles per minute 
input, tracking was often maintained as well as when 
their eyes remained open for a five second period. It 
appeared from this that movement control could be inter-
nalized for short periods of time with freedom from 
visual control. The same cannot be said for kinesthe-
tic feedback. Howard and Templeton (1966) specified 
that kinesthesis included the discrimination of movement 
and amplitude of movement of body parts, whether these 
were actively or passively produced. 
Work has been done to show the importance of kin-
esthesis in the control of movements by blocking the 
kinesthetic cues. Lazlo (1966) found that loss of kin-
esthetic sense resulting from ischemia, is detrimental 
to tapping. Gibbs (1965) suggested that when subjects 
were required to make rapid movements in the opposite 
direction to step function signals, they eccaaionally 
started the movement in the wrong direction. Early in 
practice the mean time to correct was only .11 sec. · 
The implication he made was that the latter time was 
too fast for visual correction and was in fact due to 
kinesthetic correction. A study by Notterman & Page 
(1962) compared two types of tracking. There was 
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performance with a moveable control stick having various 
degrees of elasticity, viscous damping and inertia on 
the one hand and performance with an isometric control 
in which elasticity, damping, and inertia were computer-
controlled constants. The relation between the force 
of the operator on the control and the oscilloscope out-
put was the same in both cases, but with the moveable 
control, the operator had kinesthetic feedback arising 
from the movements as well as the force. It is inter-
esting to compare the aspects of feedback involved in 
this experiment with the use of the gear lever in the 
motor car. It was the opinion of the writer that the 
kinesthetic and auditory feedback ~n changing gears 
with a gear lever, clutch, and pedal would be advant-
ageous to certain drivers who resort to primary pro-
cess thinking more quickly than others. Fitts (1951) 
stated that visual control was important whilst a 
person was learning a new task;, but as performance on 
the task became habitual, it was likely that proprio-
ceptive feedback became more important. Fleischman 
& Rich (1963) continued experimental work on the idea 
of Fitts. Their conclusion was that kinesthetic pro-
ficiency is predictive of more advanced levels of psy-
chomotor performance. ·They maintained that spatial-
visual cues provided initially such information which 
guided the movements of the subject into appropriate 
patterns. In the initial stages the subject had 
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little opportunity to experience kinesthetic feedback 
as his errors remained large ones. Up to such a stage 
there had been more emphasis on spatial relationships 
as regards the control handle and the direction of the 
handle movement required to move the target follower 
toward the target. Once a given level of proficiency 
had been reached and the errors had become less , the 
spatial cues were no l onger so important. To achieve 
higher scores finer motor adjustment was required . 
Those subjects who were more sensitive to propriocept-
~on cues made good preliminary use of the spatial-
visual cues and eventually became the more proficient 
type of subject . Undoubtedly-one type of feedback 
complements another type in the assistance they g i ve 
as regulators.of activity. 
There have been attempts at the reduction of 
kinesthetic feedback during an experi mental situation. 
Chase et aZ . (1961) placed vibrators on the arm of a 
subject who had to perform a key-tapping task . It 
was possible in this way to distort the decoding of 
proprioceptive information to the central nervous 
system. However, the extent of the reduction of feed-
back by this process was questionable . Provins (1958) 
found a small decrease in isometric finger oscillation 
as a result of xylocaine nerve block. Again the result 
was not very conclusive, because only ski n and joint 
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receptors were anaesthetized and muscle and tendon re-
ceptors remained intact. In another experiment by 
Lazlo (1966) where nerve compression was applied, it 
was found that there was a pronounced performance 
decrement in the absence of kinesthetic feedback. 
Klein and Wolitzky (1969) diminished the feed-
back from the speech of a subject by masking i t with 
white noise transmitted by earphones . They f ound dis-
rupting effects, which produced an increase of drive-
related content into thought. 
Goldberger (1958) carefully screened mal e 
college students who were then isolated perceptual l y. 
They spent eight hours in a semi-soundproof room, with 
hands i n cardboard gauntlets, eyes capped with translu-
cent hal ved ping- pong balls and ears cove red with padd-
ed ear phones through which white noise was piped . Those 
who adapted best to the situation were not threatened 
by their primary process thinking. Goldberger (1958) 
felt that the more disturbed the student was by primit~ 
ive perceptions, thoughts, and drive expressions in 
the Rorschach test, the more likely he was to react 
with unpleasant affect to sensory deficit. 
Murphy (1953) put field dependent and field in-
dependent subjects under conditions of partial sensory 
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deprivation. Subjects were told of the schizophrenic-
like hallucinations that they might expect to experience. 
Field dependent but not field independent subjects showed 
a significant drop in mature function. 
Klein et al. (1955); Smith et al. (1957); and Bach 
& Klein (1957) presented evidence about sensory reduct-
ion of "gating" as it has been called by Bruner (1957) . 
They employed the technique of producing a subliminal 
stimulus by exposing two stimuli briefly and in rapid 
succession so that only the second of the pair can defi-
nitely be seen. It was found that the consciously seen 
form - the second of the pair takes on a different 
appearance in certain respects. 
3.4 Percepti on and cognition in relation to personality 
Perception of stimuli from one's own functioning has been 
equated with feedback and shown as necessary for secondary pro-
cess thinking. Other studies have taken up the relationship 
between perception and motivation. 
Klein (1958) said: 
"· .. therefore the concept of accurate 
perception can be especially mischiev-
ous if it leads us to assume that there 
is a finality to perceptual development, 
a plateau in what can be seen. Percep-
tion pursues meanings, not exhaustive 
accuracy or totality.'' (Klein, 1958, 
p. 104) 
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The above statement reflected the earlier views on perception. 
The perceiver was regarded as a passive camera-like recorder of 
the field which was impressed on him. Klein and Schlesinger 
(1949) correctly asked about the place of the perceiver in per-
ception. Hall and Lindzey (1957) stated in their review that 
perception implies a perceiver and each perceiver is a complete 
being with his own individual personality structure and character-
istic manner of functioning. The personality structure of the 
person dictated then, his manner of perceiving. 
Witkin (1962) attempted to relate certain modes of perceiv-
ing to general types of personality. In the study of field 
dependence - independence, he indicated individual consistency 
Ln response to an embedded figures test, a rod and frame test, 
and other tests. Gardner (1962) pointed out that Witkin's experi-
mentation first and foremost sampled individual differences in 
the capacity to attend and respond selectively to relevant cues. 
Young (1961) said that the characteristics that were ascribed to 
the field dependent and independent subjects were indicated parti-
cularly on the Rorschach test. 
Not only is perception dependent on personality but Klein 
(1956) felt that perception could assist in understanding the 
link with personality in integrated activity. Perception for 
him was part of a larger adaptive act. He planned a perceptual 
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model1 which predisposes perception to motivational aspects to a 
greater degree than any writer before him. A sequence explained 
the occurrences in the individual from the time he planned the 
perception until the time that he acted on it. At the beginning 
of the sequence, there was an intention, hypothesized in the form 
of a hierarchy, consisting of a dominant aspect and aspects which 
became more peripheral. At each level of the hierarchy the intent-
ions became less consonant with the dominant intention until those 
at the outer most fringes were completely non-adaptive and irrele-
vant. Next in the sequence, which could also be regarded as the 
reconstruction of those aspects of the external reality which co-
ordinated with the perceptual intent, was the phenomenal image. 
Again there was a hierarchy with certain qualities which were very 
relevant to the intention, at the centre, then others, which could 
pe brought to awareness, then others which were disconnected and 
unconscious . Images, for instance, aroused by an unconscious 
voyeurism might form an apt representation, 1n a particular form 
of object. At the final stage of the sequence the percepts were 
translated into acts of communication, or discharge in fantasy or 
imagery, or some manipulative action upon the object-field. Klein 
mentioned that: 
"The effects of motivational partiaipation 
may be seen not only at various levels of 
response during the laboratory situation, 
1. A detailed description of the perception model appears 
in McCary, J.L. (1956). Psychology of Personality. 
New York: Grove Press, Inc. 121-199. 
but in later airaumstanaes and in altered 
states of awareness, as in d:r>eams, day-
dreams, reverie states, eta., when execut-
ive intentions of aonsaious, purposeful 
thought are no longer aative." (Klein, 
1956, p. 189) 
In the usual perceptual model, personality constants have been 
neglected and the emphasis has been on the perceptual process 
itself. A valid cognitive style which accounts for the integra-
tion and consistency of the behaviour of a person, appeared to 
the writer to be based on the one hand on the ego-id autonomy 
balance, and on the other hand, on the entry of primary process 
thinking and secondary process aspects on the formation of what 
is called the phenomenal image. 
The entry of "other" motives into what is perceived, was 
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very important for the thesis about perception which Klein wished 
to develop . He quoted Fisher, (1954), as having said that the 
experimenter's explicit instructions in the experimental set-up 
did not exhaust the motivational context of the expe~iment . There 
were many aspects like the significance of the setting; of the ex-
perimenter himself; the apparatus; the task itself that could 
activate motives at other levels. Klein (1956) himself said: 
"From these obse'PVations it is possible to 
say that, if intentions of the executive 
variety set up an anticipatory framework 
for foraussing the subjeat on aertain and 
not other attributes of the field (e.g. 
only upon the taahistosaopiadlly exposed 
piature), so is it possible to speak also 
of intentions areated by "more silent" 
motives whiah ·also aompete for the total 
field of perceptual registrations." 
(Klein, 1956, p. 156) 
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Since 1950 researchers at the Menninger Foundation have 
been engaged in investigations which have focussed upon individual 
consistencies in certain aspects of cognitive functioning. Holzman 
(1954) used the terms "levellers" and "sharpeners" to differentiate 
between two types of perceivers. The "levellers" appeared to deve-
lop a stable preconceived notion of the sizes of squares and assi-
milated their subsequent percepts to this notion rather than con-
sidering each stimulus on its merit. The extreme "leveller" seem-
ed to have unusually limited quantities of-neutralized energy for 
the spontaneous cathexis of new events. 
Gardner (1961) worked in terms of what he called "field 
articulation" and hypothesized that "field articulation" appeared 
as selectiveness of attention, the capacity to direct attentipn 
appropriately to the significant features of the field and to dis-
regard the irrelevant aspects. Gardner was impressed by the degree 
of i ndividual consistency in his results as regards these variables . 
In a large number of studies (Gardner et aZ., 1959, 1960; 
Gardner & Lohrenz, 1960; Gardner & Long, 1961; Gardner et aZ. , 
1960; Holzman & Gardner, 1959) the work of discovering indivi-
dual consistencies in assimilation among new percepts and relat-
ed memories of earlier percepts was continued. In all this work 
there was a characteristic emergence of enduring patterns of 
cognitive functioning, with definite cognitive controls that 
mediated the expression of particular intentions when the indi-
. 
vidual was confronted with particular stimulus conditions. 
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Gardner and Moriarty (1968) have also worked with what they 
called the "tolerance of perceptual ambiguity". This tol~rance 
appeared in the perception of apparent movement phenomena. The 
more tolerant perceived apparent movement over a wider range of 
conditions. They showed freer imagination in responses to Rorsch-
ach inkblots. The less tolerant were less ready to perceive the 
distortions produced by viewing through aniseikonic lenses. The 
less tolerant had lower thresholds for flicker fusion. Loomis 
and Moskowitz (1959) showed a relationship between tolerance of 
perceptual ambiguity and constricted or flexible control. 
Many of the studies quoted above were designed within the 
framework of an ego psychology. Such a framework was important 
because the complete understanding of cognitive structures and 
action following as a result of those structures would depend 
upon the consideration of the balance of ego and id autonomies. 
3.5 Ego psychology and psychodiagnostic testing 
Schafer (1967) suggested that the discoveries of Freud and 
the recent developments in ego psychology appeared to furnish the 
most searching and comprehensive means for understanding and capi-
talizing upon the Rorschach situation. Whilst Schafer had always 
been prominent for his attempts to relate psychoanalytic theory 
to psychodiagnostics, it was in his newer work that he moved 
away from the classical tension-reduction theory to the newer 
ego psychological approach. He said: 
"I explain briefly my stress on ~ontem­
por~ Freudian psychoanaZysis. This 
stress indicates that the ego will 
ocaupy a central position in the follow-
ing remaPks. It indicates that psycho-
analysis long ago pushed beyond the 
theoretical and clinicaZ point of fasci-
nation only with instinctual tendencies 
and associated primitive acts and fanta-
sies, and the methodological point of 
persistent endeavour t;o derrr:mstrate only 
the universality of these tendencies, 
acts and fantasies .... Psychoanalytic 
theo~ has become progressively more 
concerned with individual stylistic 
differences in the selective control, 
modification, and expression of these 
instinctual trends. At the same time, 
it has become more concerned with the 
origins of these individual differences 
- in culture and in constitutional pre-
disposition as well as in early fami Zy 
experie?J.ces. The study of the origins 
and organization of individuaZ differ-
ences in this Zight is essentially the 
psychoanaZytic study of the ego. The 
concept "ego" is a broad one, subsum-
ing such varied phenomena as control 
of and defense against impuZses, reaZ-
ity testing, modes of interpersonal 
relationship, communication, purpose-
ful motility, creativity, and self-
integrative efforts, and all the finer 
phenomena subsumed in turn by these, 
such as concentration, judgment, con-
cept formation, and verbal and motor 
learning. " 
(Schafer, 1967, p. 15, 16) 
Rapaport (1968) said that the consistent exploration of projett-
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ive tests was the exploration of thought processes. It was notic-
ed that in the projective test the unconscious makings of the 
thought process would occasionally become palpable but ~n the 
main, projective tests were concerned with the type of organ1z-
ation of thinking palpable in the course·of spontaneous thought 
processes. 
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The e go psychological app r oach gave new oppor tunities to 
clinical testing particularly as far as the Rorschach was concern-
ed. It came at a time when criticism of psychodiagnostics was 
becoming provocative. Zubin et al. (1965) said: 
'Projective techniques were once young 
and promising. Today, they are only 
pro~s~ng. How long can they continue 
to promise without delivering?" 
(Zubin, Eron & Schumer, 1965, p. 610) 
At the same time ego psychology with its emphasis on the 
growth of cognitive functions and adaptation has gradually g~ven 
psychoanalysis a ne~ respectability. A consideration of psycho-
diagnostics with an ego psychological matrix could again contri-
bute to clinical psychiatry in the form of description of normal 
and abnormal behaviour; dynamic interaction of mental mechanisms; 
evaluation of psychotherapy; and concepts of change and prognosis. 
Molish (1968) has said: 
"The tools afforded by experimental ego 
psychology are already available, by 
which much of the theoretical framework 
of projective techniques can be further 
expanded and refined. " 
(Molish, 1968, p. 114) 
3.5.1 Ego psychological propositions for Rorschach testing 
Schafer (1967) mentioned certain approaches basic 
to ego psychology which woulp refine Rorschach analysis. 
Firstly, he spoke of the interpersonal dynamics of the 
test situation, or the ways that tester and patient 
alike, present themselves. Such presentation would 
include their histories and life circumstances in 
the sense that these would influence the manner of 
responding. Secondly, recognition of the regressive 
and counterregressive movement in the creative aspects 
of the response. The adaptivity of the subject allows 
archaic, normally unconscious and preconscious fanta-
sies, modes of reasoning, memories, concepts and images 
to come to consciousness in order that they may be sub-
sequently molded, revised, reintegrated, and otherwise 
manipulated by critical, reality-orientated ego funct-
~ons. Thirdly, analysis of defence has been recogni-
sed as essential in psychoanalytic explanation and 
treatment. The defensive structure of the patient 
becomes very clear in the form and content of his re-
sponses . The extent of defence would accordingly 
impede the adaptation of the patient. 
The fourth approach mentioned, centred around 
the concept of "ego-identity" as elaborated by Erikson 
(1950). In a later work, Erikson said: 
"In the individual it is the ego's task 
to promote the mastery of experience and 
the guidance of action in such a way that 
a certain wholeness synthesis is, ever 
again, created between the diverse and 
conflicting stages and aspects of life -
between immediate impressions and associ-
ated memories, between impelling wishes 
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and compelling demands, between the most 
private and the most public aspects of 
existence. To do its job, the ego deve-
lops modes of synthesis as well as screen-
ing methods and mechanisms of defense. As 
it matures through the constant interaction 
of maturational forces and environmental 
influences, a certain duality develops be-
tween higher levels of integration, which 
permits a greater tolerance of tension and 
diversity, and lower levels of order where 
totalities and conformities must help to 
preserve a sense of security. The study of 
those fusions and defusions which - on the 
individual level - make for a successful 
wholeness or an attempted totality thus 
belongs to the realm of psychoanalytic ego 
psychology." (Erikson, 1968, p. 81, 82) 
In the Rorschach, the ego-identity of the patient is 
often shown in the themes which are built around a 
response . The four above-mentioned approaches have 
been utilized by Holt (1963) in his work for testing 
of the primary process. 
3.5.2 Rorschach measures of primary process thinking 
(a) Content 
Schafer (1967) pointed out that responses, which, 
1n the usual manner of Rorschach interpretation, would 
have appeared in different content categories might, 1~ 
fact, have a common theme, such as guilt, orality, 
aggression, etc. Secondly, a single response might be 
viewed from several different angles, viz., an indicat-
ion of the self-image of the patient; an indication of 
the interpersonal orientation; or an indication of the 
drive direction. Thirdly, a response might be indicat-
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ive of high ego functioning and yet bizarre content 
in the same record. Thus Schafer (1967) gave the 
example of "a man with a fang coming out of his mouth" 
as being a response in card IX of very qccurate form 
perception, yet of the most primitive levels of the 
unconscious processes. 
The Rorschach has been regarded as an impersonal, 
ambiguous, and unstructured situation. The subject is 
required to produce a ser1es of visual images from the 
unstructured cards. Because of the complexity of the 
stimuli in each card , a large number of images might be 
produced. Different people might produce different 
images for the same area. Though some of the images 
are more accurate and representative than others, none 
of the areas have any counterpart in reality . Thus the 
demand for organization and synthesis is there, bu t it 
is met with extreme difficulty. The unstructuredness 
would appear to favour the emergence of primary modes 
of thinking. When material is unstructured, it is also 
easier for fringe perceptual intent to contain unconsci-
ous wish material. Freud (1961) said that thinking in 
pictures stood nearer to the unconscious processes than 
did thinking in words. Noy (1969) had suggested that 
the development of a word representation instead of a 
thing representation inplied secondary process develop-
ment. 
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Schafer (1967) pointed out that a number of givens 
or constants see~ed to characterize the person who took 
the Rorschach test. Fantasy was encouraged and accord-
ing to the desire to comply, the subject regressed "in 
service of the ego". The fact that the subject was re-
quired to give vent to free imagination, rel~eved him 
of much responsibility for the content of his responses. 
Schafer (1967) said: 
"This opportunity to externalize respons-
ibility and to Wal'd off superego anxiety 
fv~ther deepens the reaches of the consci-
ousness and tends in suhtl._ ways to in-
fantilize the patient's emotional position." 
(Schafer, 1967, p. 62-63) 
The test required communication of intimate, even, i f no. , 
' ' ... t t.is rud.: pcz,c:i,u i.oq·i.:a! ~ntrusion 
by a stranger stimulat~s in the patient 
an anxious sense of violated privacy, 
emotional vulnerability, and defense-
lessness." (Schafer, 1967, p. 63) 
Baer (1950) mentioned that the very fact that there was 
no k~ow~edge of the d~sirapility of the responses, cau$ed 
anxiety, uncertainty, and feelings of rejection. 
All these and other tester-s~bject-test relation-
ships would give rise to additional primary process 
thinking. 
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(b) Formal characteristics 
Rapaport (1968) said : 
"The formal. characteristics~ in contrast~ 
give information about the patient of which 
he is hardly or not at aZ.Z. aware. They 
indi~ate the function patterns of his aware-
ness~ rather than its content - that is~ in 
what way he tends to become aware of situ-
ations~ or experiences his affects~ or 
avoids or elaborates on them. The content 
of a response · can be controlled by the 
subjects~ modified by speculation~ or rvan 
suppressed; but the formal. characteristics 
are expressions of perceptual. organising 
and associative processes which are not 
consciously experienced and hence not 
amenable to conscious censorship." 
(Rapaport, 1968, p. 284) 
(c) Regression in service of the ego 
Schafer (1967) pointed out that in a projective 
test such as the Rorschach more regression ~n the service 
of the ego is required because the subject is required to 
create something from an unstructured situation. The 
mature subject uses regression in servi ce of the ego to 
respond with a wide range of f orms and content. In the 
course of his creating something that fits in, both ~n 
terms of stimulus and situation, he establishes a dis-
tance from participation, with curious, humorous and 
interested expression. Distanciation helps the subjec t 
to differentiate between inner and outer . He does not 
have to live out the response himself, this being some-
thing which might cause him to be hostile, agitated, 
elated or depressed. Overparticipation caus~s insuffici-
ent working-out and the entry of uncontrolle d archaic 
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material. Defence cannot be relaxed at any stage . The 
responses of the subject demand defence . As has been 
mentioned above, pr1mary process can be expected to be 
found in the responses, but the ego mastery of the sub-
ject assists him to defend effectively against being 
overwhelmed by primitive thinking. 
(d) Rorschach and delay of impulse 
Rapaport (1968) has pointed out that the 
development of the ego and thought processes was found-
ed on the progressive mastery over the impulses. In 
the case of the infant, action arises out of needs that 
are instinctual in their origins. These set up tensions 
which require release. Whilst such release is limited 
to a few ways at the beginning of life, development 
~auses a variety of channels which might be appropriate 
for release to be established. The process of selection 
i nvolves psychological process called delay of impulse. 
Such psychological delay is not necessarily temporal 1n 
nature. It is more in the nature of a regulation of the 
thought processes so that there might be an adequate 
testing of reality. Rapaport 0966) said: 
"In turn, these selecti ve. pr>obings make 
for> more and more delay of action, in-
asmuch as the ensuing differ>entiation 
of the psychological envir>o~ent makes 
the sear>ch for> satisfaction much mor>e 
complex. Thus a kind of self-pe~etua­
ting system of probing and delay comes 
about, which extends its scope to wider> 
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and wider areas of the person's function-
ing. The various methods of selective 
probing derive their driving power from 
the original instinctive source; but as 
development proceeds they become relat-
ively independent of this source and 
are able to regulate autonomously the 
availability and mode of expenditure of 
these instinctual energies .... Thus 
autonomous derivatives of the original 
drive are built up. These derivatives 
are partly in the nature of ideation or 
thought processes, and partly more of 
an impulsive character like their in-
stinctual sources. 11 (Rapaport, 1968, 
p. 377) 
When regulation or delay proceeds smoothly, there would 
appear to be a correct balance of primary and secondary 
process thinking for a particular person. The nature of 
the balance is different for different persons . 
Form responses were regarded by Rapaport (1968) as 
representative of the autonomy of the perceptual and 
thought processes from the unconscious factors . A form 
response, in its purest state, was completely unsullied 
by the instinctual aspect. This was, however , only a 
hypothetical state, for civilization demands that affect 
and anxiety form part of thinking. To practice total 
inhibition of impulsivity would have denied the existence 
of the earliest modes of thinking of the infant. Good 
formal logical thinking must strike a balance between 
undue inhibition and undue impulse. Delay of impulse 
was regarded as the process involved in the working out 
of a good form response. Rapaport (1968) said: 
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"The subject's mode of functioning should 
allow for the delay necessary for a per-
ceptual articulation of the inkblot~ for 
an initiation of associative processes 
on the basis of the initial, perceptual 
impressions~ for a consequent reorganiz-
ation of the perceptual material, to 
obtain a congruence with the possibili-
ties offered by the associative processes 
and finaUy for a critical, appraisal, of 
the response which came forth; otherwise 
the form level of the response will be 
poor. " (Rapaport, 1968, p. 344) 
In the Rorschach system of scoring, the F+% indicated the 
general effectiveness of delay of impulse to obtain a 
good form score. Holt (1963) provided additional scores 
in his system of primary process scoring system to pursue 
a highly differentiated qualitative analysis of form 
responses. 
In the case of the M response, there was a si~lar 
effectiveness of delay. Rapaport (1968) advanced the 
hypothesis that these responses were highly integrative. 
The person who gave M responses possessed rich associa-
tive resources with which he was able to correct the pe~-
ceptual imbalance and anticipate in a flexible way a 
configuration other than that given in the blot. The as-
sociative resources were able to integrate many form 
elements and their spatial relationships into a very 
stable effect. Rapaport felt that for all such function-
ing to take place presupposed excellence in the ability 
.. 
to delay impulse. FM or animal responses were reported 
by Piotrowski (1957) to occur when there was a diminished 
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consciousness, lesser self-control and a lowered inte-
gration. Delay of impulse was thus less effective than 
in the case of M. 
Finally the degree of control or delay of impulse 
was seen in the various colour responses. In pure C there 
was almost total absence of delay and a short-circuiting 
caused components which were usually unconscious to enter 
consciousness. The CF response showed only minimally 
effective delay with slight integration of association 
and perception. It was the FC response on the other hand 
that was indicative of a flexible control and careful re-
gulation of the perceptual and associative processes. 
Piotrowski (1957) considered degree of control 
from a different point of view. He said: 
"The fundamental psychological differences 
between cR and c'R consists in the cR indi-
cating a deep-seated need for alleviating 
anxiety by a decrease of overt . activity in 
those spheres of Zife which cause fears and 
anxiety., and the c'R indicating a deep-
seated need for alleviating fears and 
anxiety by an increase in overt activity, 
particularly in those spheres ~f life which 
cause the fears .and anxiety. The indivi-
dual with prorrrinent cR tends to assume an 
attitude of restraint and watchfulness when 
he feels anxious; he delays actions he con-
siders important. Actions are delayed des-
pite the fact that heightened excitations 
and awareness of the potenti~Z destructive 
power of the environment becomes more keen. 
The more numerous the c'R, other .conditions 
being equal, the stronger is the impuls~ to 
do something overt and de~nite in order to 
66 
remove or change the anxiety-producing situ-
ation~ and the angrier and keener becomes 
the awareness of one's personal strength. 
The stronger the cR~ the greater is the 
opportunism; the stronger the c'R~ the 
greater is the tendency to take great 
chances~ to challenge the powerful~ and 
to act hastily and imprudently." 
(Piotrowski, 1957, p. 262, 263) 
The shading responses were summarized by the author as 
referring to mechanisms of control over the outward mani-
festation of emotions, including manifest anxiety. The 
sum of c were compared to the F+%, both being regarded 
as indicators of positive capacity to restrain and con-
trol overt behaviour. F+% was regarded as an indication 
of conscious self-regulating control which did not re-
quire conscious watchfulness. 
3.6 Aggression and its relationship to ego psychology 
Selzer and Payne (1962) reported their interviews with 
sixty men 1n a Veteran's Hospital. Only one of the subjects 
was conscious of making a suicide attempt by automobile. The 
others believed that their traffic accidents were fortuitous . 
Menninger (1936) in his own studies, concluded that: 
"In many of these accidents ... illuminating 
instances can be shown to fulfi n so speci-
fically the unconscious tendencies of the 
victim that we are compelled to believe 
either that they represent the capitaliza-
tion of some opportunity for self-destruct-
ion by the death instinct or else were in 
some obscure way brought about for this 
very purpose." (Menninger, 1936, p. 6) 
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Opposed to unconscious aggression, would be the self-preserv-
ative functions of the ego, which includes the understanding 
of cause and effect, and the control of dangerous wishes. 
Frankl (1963) noted for instance, that self-preservation is 
impaired if there is a lowering of the libidinal cathexis of 
the self due to neglect by the mother. Accident-prone children 
showed a persistence of compulsive action, a turning of aggress-
ion against the self, and a t endency to act out the mother's 
unconscious destructive wish. 
The following sections considered aggression particularly 
because it formed part of the measure of primary process think-
ing as devised by Holt (1963). 
3.6.1 The nature of aggr ess ion 
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Aggn~ss ion has be t> ;, lii.. . c rib 12d as bc,ing de termin~?d 
either by environment .1 l f orms such ..1s cultur al condition-
ing (Clemente & Lindsley, 1967) or biologically (Lorenz, 
1966). The fact that writers have attributed aggression e~­
ther to nature or nurture, has been mirrored in psycho-
analytic theory where it has been allocated to the id and 
to the ego. 
In Freud's earlier findings (1905) about the nature 
of the instinctual drives, impulses of an aggressive 
nature were treated as components of the libido. In a 
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space of a decade, Freud (1915) suggested that the aggres-
sive impulses were that part of the ego which served self-
preservation. Further clarification of the structural con-
cepts, the ego, id and superego made t~is assumption unten-
able . Hartmann et al. (1949) said: 
"The ego, L-.e. the psyahia organization 
oriented toward the external world, in 
aontrol of synthesis of aonfliats, and 
motility .. peraeption, and thought aould 
no longer be assumed to be equipped with 
drives of its own •... (Hartmann et al., 
1949, p. 10) 
At the same time, clinical observations indicated that 
the assumption. that aggressive impulses were only a part 
of a drive to mastery was not satisfactory. It seemed 
appropriate, Hartmann pointed out, that there should be 
a discrimination between various types of mastery, some 
of which were 1n part correlated to various functions of 
the ego; others which appeared as manifestations rather 
than as source of aggression. It was better to assume 
that aggressive impulses were manifestations of an 
independent, primary (innate) aggressive or destructive 
drive. Hartmann et al. (1949) compared aspects of the 
libido and aggression as primary drives and specially 
pointed to the fact that whilst Freud had introduced 
ideas on the neutralization of the libido he had not 
sufficiently elaborated on the neutralization of aggress-
ive energy. Neutralization of aggressive energy was re-
garded by the authors as very important for the achieve-
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ment of permanent object relations. It also supplied the 
ego and superego with motor power and equipped particular-
ly the ego for its function in action. Hartmann et al. 
(1949) continued with the following important implications: 
"In an objeotive danger situation disoharge 
of aggressive energy is no~al and physio-
logioally performed; sexualization of obj eot-
ive danger leads to pathology (masoohism). 
Sinoe we oonsider objeotive danger situations 
as a prototype of all danger situations this 
differenoe in the relation of the two instin-
otual drives to objeotive danger may have far-
reaching oonsequenoes for a general theory of 
neuroses (Hartmann). 
Aggressive energy not disoharged in fight may 
be internalized. It may be used as oathexis 
of the superego and be a source of guilt feel-
ings; internationalization may also lead to 
neutralization of aggressive energy in the ego 
without interfering with the integrity of the 
individual; if it is internalized (in the ego) 
without neutralization the inoentive to some 
kind of self-destruction may exist. It will 
be important to olarify in future the condit-
ions under whioh these different solutions 
ocour. While muoh seems to depend on the 
nature of the reality situation, particularly 
on the gravity of the danger, and on v~o~ssi­
tudes of the aggressive drive in the individ~ 
ual's previous life, a deoisive part is play-
ed by the struoture of the ego and the super-
ego. Tentatively we are inolined to assume 
that the capaoity to neutralize large quanti-
ties of aggression may oonstitute one of the 
oriteria of "ego strength" or of the high 
capaoity of the ego for integration. Alter-
natively, the internalization of non-neutral-
ized aggressive. energy in the ego may be the 
hallmark of a weak, or eventually masoohistio, 
ego." (Hartmann et al., 1949, p. 24) 
Hartmann did much for psychology with his consider-
ations of the gradations of aggressive energy. The whole 
aspect of neutralization according to Joseph (1973) intro-
duced the idea that: 
" ... ego activities were cathected by more 
instinctualized aggressive energy while 
invaded by conjtict~ and more de-aggress-
ified energy while functioning freer of 
conjtict . " (Joseph, 1973, p. 211) 
In conclusion Marcovitz (1973) has said: 
"A healthy feeling of one's own worthiness 
depends on the ability to meet difficulties~ 
obstacles and challenges that are inevitable 
in the process of living. In the absence of 
such a feeling about oneself~ we find feel-
ings of helplessness~ dependence~ anxiety~ 
and depression which we know lead inevitably 
to varieties of ineffective~ inappropriate 
aggression which are usually more destruct-
ive and self-defeating than unconjticted 
aggression would be. " 
(Marcovitz, 1973, p. 232, 233) 
3.7 The role of therapy in the prevention of accidents 
The traf f ic accident phenomenon has rapidly become a 
universal one . The road, t he vehicle and the driver have been 
mentioned as three interacting agencies in the causation of road 
accidents. Prevention of accidents will have to centre around 
aspects of these three accident agencies. 
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Improvement of the dri.ver' s ability by means of any psycho-
logical therapy, has not been described to any degree in the 
literature of accident research. This might be due to the fact 
a driver would, in the first instance, have to volunteer for such 
therapy. In addition the emp loyers of professional drivers might 
find it more economical to train new drivers than to persist with 
an accident repeater. In the future, however, it could easily 
be feasible that laws concerning the holding of driver's licences 
might compel an individual to involve himself in some form of 
therapy if this were considered necessary. Haddon (1964) warned 
that it might lead to misuse to apply administrative action 
against individuals who have been repeatedly involved in accidents, 
for the simple reason that psychological evidence is not convincing 
enough. Steyn (1973) adopted an opposite approach when he said: 
"Much has been said about the democratic 
right of an individual. to hoZ.d a driver's 
Licence. Such an argument is naive and 
inconsistent; it is not the democratic 
right of an epileptic to drive a vehicle~ 
it is not the democratic right of a con-
victed drunk to drive a vehicle; why 
should it be the democratic right of a 
psychoZ.ogicaZ.Z.y deviant and maladjusted 
person~ potentiaZ.Z.y capable of kiZ.Z.ing 
people?" (Steyn, 1973 , p. 83) 
De Silva (1942) recognized that the public would resist 
encroachment on their freedom to drive automobiles as they wish-
ed, and knew that the attempt to convince them to seek assist-
ance would be very difficult . He nevertheless felt that the two 
important elements of safety-mindedness, namely, responsibility 
and consideration for others, needed development through educat-
1on and good example. 
Shaw and Sichel (1971) have pointed out that : 
" •.. an undue proneness to accidents can be 
caused by many factors as it represents a 
variety of human maladjustments. It 
is therefore similar to other complex 
human maladjustments~ like incompet-
ence or criminality~ and has may causes. 
But these causes can be determined and 
remedial action can be taken. " 
(Shaw and Sichel, 1971, p. 421) 
3.7.1 Prerequisites for therapy 
The implementation of a programme of therapy would 
follow from indications obtained from a diagnosis of the 
accident repeater 's records. Causes which are easiest to 
determine and identify would be the subject of the first 
remedial action. Other causes might not be readily appar-
ent. They might be identifiable from statistical records, 
for instance . Remediation in such a case might be a 
programme of education for the public about the particular 
cause or hazard . Finally there are causes which might be 
sought for Ln the thought processes of the individual. In 
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such cases it was considered convenient if the theory under-
lying the diagnosis be consistent for pre-test and post-
test description of the individual . The change which would 
result from therapy should be the slow evolving of the 
patterns of structure considered bad to those considered 
good. 
3.7.2 Change resulting from therapy 
Eysenck (1952) suggested that from material 
available, patients treated with psychotherapy, showed 
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no more improvement than untreated populations. Freud 
(1937) had himself raised questions about the potential 
effectiveness of psychoanalysis as a form of therapy. 
He recorded his impression that psychoanalysis might 
often merely strengthen defenses rather than resolve 
basic conflict. Eisler (1950) defended change occurr-
ing as a result of psychoanalysis and suggested that 
appearance of change which occurred in conjunction with 
other forms of therapy were often based on suggestion, 
imitation, unwitting reinforcement of resistances or 
transference phenomena. He implied that the more effect-
ive and permanent change occurred when there was change 
of structure. Schafer (1967) continued such a line of 
reasoning and pointed out that the changes in the formal 
.thought patterns of the patient were the most solid forms 
of change. Such formal thought aspects operated independ-
ently from the drives, defenses and conceptions of real-
ity. He said: 
"· •. they inal:ude the foUowing: the degree 
of autistia distortion running through psyahia 
funationing - irrespeative of the aontent and 
loaale of the autisms; the pervasive, defen-
sively presaribed methods of organizing, arti-
aulating, and communiaating emotional experi-
enaes; consistent selective emphasis in per-
ceiving and remembering; char>aateristia pat- . 
terns in the organization of space, time, and 
motility; degree and style of humor; aapaaity 
for introspeativeness; and tolerance for free 
fantasy and self-confrontation." (Schafer, 
1967, p. 40) 
Whilst in content, there could be superficial change, 
especially where the patient began to catch on to the methods 
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and emphases of the therapist, change in the formal aspects 
of thought is more suitable for an indication of the effect-
iveness of therapy. 
3.7.3 Ego psychology and therapy 
Freud did not wri te any systematized account of analy-
tic therapy, nor did he Aesignate standard procedures to be 
followed 1n therapy except of course, the rule of free asso-
ciation. His life work consisted, however, of assisting 
people. His followers elaborated on his principles of 
assistance . They elaborated on the idea of learning to 
know oneself; accepting emotional attitudes belonging to 
oneself; and understanding the dynamics which created and 
maintained conflicts. His observations that the ego was 
the recipient and synthesizer of interpretations lead to 
advances in ego psychology. The ego psychologist now en-
gages 1n the continuous analytic pursuit of strengthening 
and expanding the ego, remedying developmental shortcomings, 
aiding neutralizations and utilizing the autonomous funct-
ions toward higher levels of integration. 
Classical psychoanalysts had worked at the rapid un-
covering of the id content but ego psychotherapy helped the 
individual understand his defensive structure. As the re-
sistance crumbled before the synthetic and integrative fun-
ctions of the ego, the individual achieves insight, usually 
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with little help from the therapist . As the person reached 
the terminal stage of therapy he was able to delay response; 
regress in service of the ego; and utilize verbalization in-
stead of acting out type of communication. 
3.7.4 The Rorschach and ego psychotherapy 
Buss (1966) pointed out that diagnosis in medicine 
traditionally had three purposes: firstly, it told some-
thing about the etiology of the disorder; secondly, it 
suggested something about the prognosis of the disorder; 
and thirdly, the diagnosis pointed to the type of treat-
ment to be given, The traditional manner of applying a 
psychodiagnos~ic programme has not warranted its use by 
therapists. Meehl (1959) discovered in his investigation 
that only 17% of therapists questioned, used diagnostic 
testing before treatment. If psychodiagnosting testing 
is to survive, it will have to fulfil to a certain degree 
the same purposes as those of medical diagnosis . Cole 
and Magnussen (1966) have suggested that diagnostic cate-
gories should be developed which could be related empiric-
ally to treatment outcome . Meehl (1960) said that it 
greatly speeded therapy if the therapist had prior know-
ledge of the dynamics of the client and content from such 
devices as the Rorschach . Schafer (1967) wrote extensive-
ly about the value of Rorschach test analysis as a measure 
of psychological change. He indicated that the projective 
technique showed an indirect approach to the functioning 
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of the patient. The clear emergence of self-expressive and 
defensive aspects of mental functioning was facilitated. 
Schafer (1967) illustrated the changes within the ego from 
an initial test to a retest after therapy in a number of 
different ways . . Firstly, there was sharper differentiat-
ion between self-representation and object representation. 
Secondly, where an individual in the initial test, showed 
a helplessness of the ego before a destructive superego, 
he might in the retest show a degree of containment of the 
superego by directed, assertive action. Thirdly, a normal 
form of response was found where initially pathological 
weakness of defense had indicated a direct representation 
of archaic fantasy in consciousness. Improved reality test-
ing might emerge in the form of greater autonomy of the ego 
function from drives and affects; ascendency of secondary 
over primary process thinking; and more adequate, less arbi-
trary synthe tic functioning. Finally there was more regre-
ssion in service of the ego in the form of more creative 
and adaptive responses . 
Schafer was well aware of methodological aspects 
which were needed to give the high order of conceptual and 
clinical sophistication to the study of personality change 
in test and retest situations. He mentioned the need for 
independent judges to establish reliability of interpret-
ation. Independent judges were required to avoid contamin-
ated interpretations . Such judges, at the same time, would 
have to have a knowledge of which was the initial and 
which was the retest protocol aided in noting significant 
changes toward more adequate ego functioning. Schafer 
recognized that it was good that a patien t be compared 
with himself. ·He also said that the quantitative direct-
ion needed careful attention because the good clinician 
recognised that sometimes significant changes were i ndi-
cated by relatively small scores . Finally he mentioned _ 
the following very important methodological feature: 
" . . . the research unit should be inter-
pretations and not scores or theme counts. 
OnZy then may we continue to work in con-
text, which is to say, work with cZinicaZ 
data, cZinicaZZy . Scores, content, sequ-
ence, attitudes, behaviour, and styZe of 
verbalization must aZZ feed into the inter-
pretations." (Schafer, 1967, p . 81) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
T~ PRESENT STUDY 
4.1 The aims of the present study 
(a) The study attempted to discover whether the 
drivers of motor vehicles who were considered 
to be rational and mature thinkers when tested, 
had a lower accident liability than those who 
were impulsive and immature. 
(b) The study attempted to discover whether the 
different determinants of a test measure would 
discriminate between good and bad drivers. 
(c) Tha study planned to discover whether differ-
ences in the amount of feedback, as determined 
~n a psychomotor task, bore any relationship 
to driving ability or the thought processes of 
the driver. 
(d) An attempt was made to discover whether any of 
the scores referred to in (a), (b), or (c) 
above, could be used as predictors of driving 
ability. 
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(e) The study aimed at making some conclusions as 
to the extent to which the preceding psycho-
diagnostic programme, when considered in the 
light of ego psychology, could contribute to 
the treatment planning of drivers. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1 General hypothesis 
The accident liability of drivers will be associ-
ated directly with the degree to which their thought is 
dominated by the primary process function. 
4.2 . 2 Specific hypotheses 
(a) An hypothesis relating accident liability to primary 
process dominance which is inferred from Rorschach 
measures viz., Holt's system of primary process 
scores . 
Hl High accident liability ~s correlated with 
i High pn.mary process scores 
ii High content scores 
iii High formal scores 
iv Low creativity scores 
v Low form level scores 
v~ High aggression scores. 
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(b) An hypothesis relating accident liability to the 
degree of control of response inferred from select-
ed Rorschach determinants . 
H2 High accident liability ~s correlated with 
~ Low Mi. 
ii Low FC% 
~~~ Low M/FM 
~v Low FC/CF+C 
v High C'/c 
v~ Low F+% 
(c) An hypothesis relating accident liability to differ-
ence in the amount of feedback aiding motor activity 
ln a laboratory task. 
H3 High accident liability ~s correlated with 
high feedback error which is measured ~n a 
modified Mo"ede two-hand motor co-ordination 
test. 
4. 3 Research design 
4 . 3. 1 Definition of the population 
The population was defined as consisting of experi-
enced motor vehicle drivers . This meant that they were 
in possession of a driver's licence and had driven for 
at least three months on public roads . None had been 
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guilty of any major driving offence in their official 
vehicles. 
4.3 . 2 Definition of the sample studied 
European bus drivers belonging to the Durban 
Corporation Transport Company were chosen as a represent-
ative sample of the population defined above. Each driver 
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in the representative group had an equal opportunity of being 
selected. The group randomly chosen for testing numbered 
forty. After the testing programme had been completed, 
and a study of the accident records of the subjects begun, 
it was discovered that the accident records of. two 
drivers were incomplete. These two were then excluded and 
the final sample for the purpose of the research numbered 
thirty-eight . This sample was regarded as the most repre-
sentative for the following reasons: 
(a) They were co-operative ~n the administration of 
the psychodiagnostic programme; 
(b) they had undergone a standard type of training 
in the training school run by the Transport 
Company; 
(c) they had been subjected to a standard type of 
medical examination before their employment 
and had had repeated medical check-ups every 
six months during their service with the 
Company. They were thus regarded as medically 
fit for driving; 
(d) they had trained on the same type of vehicle 
and driving during their service with the 
Company was confined to this type of vehicle ; 
(e) each driver, during his period of service, had 
been exposed to similar driving hazards, as 
far as this was possible . It was the policy of 
the employer to change drivers from one route 
to another after a certain period of time so 
that there were periods of operation over all 
the likely routes . 
(f) each driver was subject to uniform policy as 
regards days and hours of service, remunerat-
ion, leave conditions, relationships with the 
public, and discipline. 
(g) details of the service record of each driver 
were contained in a confidential file. These 
details included the description of accidents 
involved; reports from injured parties; reports 
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4 . 3.3 
of legal proceedings; and reports of the dis-
ciplinary officers of the Company. 
Observations made on the sample1 
(a) Preliminary observations made about each driver 
included his name, age, and length of the 
service of the subject. 
(b) Subsequent to the administration and scoring 
of the test programme, the accident records 
of each driver were consulted to discover the 
dates when these accidents had occurred, and 
the total driving time of the subject. 
4.4 Test description and administration 
Two measuring instruments, namely, the Rorschach technique 
and a modified version of the Moede two-hand motor co-ordination 
test, were used to obtain scores for the research project. 
4.4.1 Description of the Rorschach test material and manner 
of administration 
The Rorschach test consists of a series of symmetri-
cal inkblots contained on ten printed cards. These ink-
1. see also appendix G 
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blots were made by spilling ink on white paper, folding 
the paper once and then pres~ing the folded halves to-
gether. When the ink had dried and the paper unfolded, 
a symmetrical design was obtained. Reproductions for 
use were made, these being mounted on white glossy plates 
7" x 9!" in size. Five of the plates contain blots in 
various shades of gray , two in red and gray, and three 1n 
bright colours. 
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In the examin~tion room the plates were placed, face 
down on the table. The examiner seated himself on the same 
side of the table as the subject in order to observe more 
effectively. This seating arrangement was carried out as 
naturally as possible. No special attempt, however, was 
made to reduce tension in the subject for it was reasoned 
that if rapport was too successful, the subject might with-
hold consciously or unconsciously some significant material . 
After an introduction and some preliminary questions had 
been answered, the subject was told that he would be shown 
the plates one at a time. He was instructed to tell the 
examiner what he felt each plate looked like; what any 
section might represent; and what the blots made him think 
of . He was allowed to turn the plate any way that he wish-
ed and when he could see nothing more to give as a respon-
se, he was requested to put the card down on the table. 
The time for each response as well as the tim~ for the 
total examination of the plate was recorded. An inquiry 
about the responses followed after each plate. During 
the inquiry the subject was reminded where he had seen 
the response, and asked if he would like to make any 
further comment about it, describe it any further, or 
tell something about it. During the inquiry the tester 
also inquired into the meaning of certain words he had 
used, and also asked the subject to say, whenever possi-
ple, whether he had enjoyed the response or not. 
4 . 4.2 Description of the modified vers1on of the Moede two-
hand motor co-ordination test and the manner of 
administration 
The apparatus consisted of a metal framework which 
contained two metal shafts situated at right angles to 
each other. At the end of each shaft was a hand-wheel 
control . Turning either hand-wheel control caused a 
metal platform to move. This platform was constructed 
so as to be situated on top of the two shafts. When the 
first hand-wheel control was turned in an anti-clockwise 
direction the platform moved towards the subject, whilst 
turning it in a clockwise direction caused the platform 
to move away from the subject. The second hand-wheel 
control, when moved in an anti-clockwise direction, caus-
ed the platform to move to the right and when turned in 
a clockwise direction would cause the platform to move 
to the left of the subject. Attached to each hand-wheel 
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control was a collar whi ch could be fastened or loosened 
with a key. The collar mechanism, built in by the author 
causes the apparatus to be different from that des cribed 
1 by Roos (1955) . 
A sheet of paper with a pr i n ted circular t arget was 
f as t ened to the platfom. The target v1as i n the form of 
, a pathway with we l l-defined boundaries . 2 The pathway was 
a quart er of an inch wi de . A cursor was secured i n a 
ver t i cal position by means of a metal ho l der in such a 
manner that i t was able to trace a path on the circular 
target as the platform moved . The cursor was brought to 
the start of the circular t arget at t he beginning of the 
t r i al by the tes t ee and a path was then traced until t he 
end of the circular pathway was reached . A standard set 
of instr uctions was arranged for the subjec ts , as follows: 
"We now come to the mechanical task which 
I would like you to do as well as you can. 
As you turn these hand-wheel controls~ 
t his platform wi ll move in a left or right 
direction or a nor th or south direction. 
At the order to start you must turn the 
wheels so that the cursor traces a line 
from this point~ called the start~ to 
the point there~ which is the end of the 
pathway. You must work quickly but care-
1. The writer is grateful to Mr . T. Bowden, a mechanical 
engineer fo r h is advice and assis t ance in building the 
apparatus . 
2. See Appendix F for photogr aphs of t he apparatus . 
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fuZZy. Do not let the cursor cross over the 
boundary Zines of the pathhJay for this wiU 
be counted against you. For a short whiZe 
now you may practice to see how weZZ you can 
keep in the pathway. " 
A brief demonstration was given to the subject after which 
he was allowed to practise for a minute. He was thereupon 
given his first five trials. The time taken to complete 
each trial was noted. Instructions for the second series 
of five trials remained exactly the same as for the first 
series and the subject was not told that he would be oper-
ating the apparatus with the loosened hand-wheel controls. 
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The operation of the apparatus was changed by turning a key 
in the locks on the hand-wheel controls. This had the 
effect of disengaging the hand-wheel controls. The first 
horizontal pin would begin to move around until engaged the 
vertical pin on the collar adjacent to the hand-wheel con-
trol. The whole collar now moved around until the horizon-
tal pin on the collar engaged the vertical pin on the shaft. 
Thus the total effect was that the hand-wheel control would 
move the platform only after some amount of time and turn-
ing had elapsed. During the period preceding final engage-
ment of the platform no mark was made on the target paper 
by the cursor. All in all, it required 1! full turns on 
the hand-wheel to move the cursor from the one boundary 
of the pathway directly across to the other boundary. 
4.5 Scoring of the test material 
This section includes a description of the following: 
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(a) Holt's system of Rorschach measures which were used to 
infer primary process thinking; 
(b) Selected Rorschach determinants which were used to 
infer the degree of control of response of the 
sub j ect; 
(c) Scores obtained from the modified vers1on of the 
Moede two-hand motor co-ordination test which were 
used to infer a feedback error; 
(d) The accident liability score. 
4. 5.1 Holt's system of Rorschach measures for primary process 
thinking 
Primary process thinking according to the method used 
1 by Holt, was measured in the first place by twenty-two 
categories of content. This arrangement was based on the 
assumption that there are responses which have libidinal 
or aggressive themes. Such responses indicate drive domi-
nation in varying degrees and would therefore manifest 
primary process thinking . Libidinal content is divided 
into six different categories, viz., oral, anal, phallic, 
1. This sunnnary was extract"ed from an unpublished draft copy 
of the 9th edition of the Rorschach manual for pripro sco-
ring, which Professor R.R. Holt was kind enough to send to 
the writer. 
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exhibitionistic, homosexual and miscellaneous . A further 
five categories are of aggressive content, viz., potential 
aggression from the standpoint of the aggressor; potential 
aggression from the standpoint of the object aggressed 
against; a category where the subject is engaged in active 
aggression; one where the object is aggressive and finally 
a category which indic~tes the results of aggression. 
Each of these categories occurs on level 1 or level 2. 
A level 2 response shows evidence of some socialized think-
ing whereas the level 1 response is blatantly libidinal or 
aggress~ve. A subject never produces drive-dominated idea-
tion as a result of his own purposeful striving. These 
responses represented rather, his own spontaneous utterances. 
They were based on his past experience; the way that he per-
ceived the unstructured Rorschach stimulus; and also what 
he felt appropriate to communicate to the tester. 
Two scores arise from this section on content. First-
ly content itself was calculated as being the total number 
of responses which contained drive-dominated ideation over 
the total number of responses in the record. A second 
score was taken as aggression. Aggression figured very 
prominently ~n the literature study as a characteristic of 
drivers and it was felt that this sub-section of content 
should receive prominence. Aggression was represented 
then as the total number of responses which indicated 
aggression over the total number of responses 1n the 
record. 
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The next section of measurement concerned the formal 
aspects of the responses. There are thirty-seven verbaliz-
ation categories which refer to the perceptual organization 
of the response and to the language in which the response 
1s verbalized. A score for these formal characteristics 
was represented as being the total number of responses which 
contain formal characteristics over the total number of res-
ponses. 
The content and formal characteristics constituted 
the amount of primary process thinking in the record. Thus 
the primary process or pripro score emerged as represent-
ing the total number of responses indicatiye of primary 
process thinking over the total number of responses 1n the 
record. 
A third section of the scoring system was concerned 
with the effectiveness or ineffectiveness with which the 
subject uses his control and defences to cope with the 
thinking in which he is involved. He might be able to 
express his ideas in an acceptable or scientific way or 
viae versa. The extent to which he is master of his com-
munications has been designated as his defense effective-
ness (DE). A DE score was expressed as the sum of the DE 
ratings in the record over the total number of pripro 
responses. A brief summary of information for the 
calculation of DE appears in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Description and rating of defense effectiveness 
Rating Description Explanation 
+2 
+2a 
+1 
+la 
0 
Oa 
-1 
-la 
-2 
-2a 
-3 
-3a 
Highly successful control 
and defense 
Highly successful response , 
undefended 
Successful control and 
defense 
Successful response 
undefended 
Moderately successful 
control and defense 
Moderately successful 
response, undefended 
Relatively unsuccessful 
control and defense 
Relatively unsuccessful 
response, undefended 
Unsuccessful control 
and .defense 
Unsuccessful response 
undefended 
Disorganized response, 
pathological attempt 
at defense 
Disorganized response, 
undefended 
High form level; no 
disturbance 
High form level; no 
disturbance 
Lower form level; 
mild discomfort 
Lower form level; 
mild discomfort 
Difficult formal and 
contrql aspects; form 
level fair. 
Difficult formal and 
control aspects; form 
level fair. 
Poor response with one 
or two saving aspects 
Poor response with one 
or two saving aspects 
Much discomfort; low 
form level 
Much discomfort; low 
form level 
Mostly in psychotic 
records 
Mostly in psychotic 
records. 
92 
93 
Holt's next concern was to measure defense demand. 
Defense demand indicates the amount or reorientation nece-
ssary to change a drive-dominated response to one that is 
socially acceptable. The more pathological the response 
the greater will be the need for control and defense. De-
fense demand (DD) was the next score and it was represent-
ed as the sum of the defense demand scores over the total 
number of primary process responses. A brief summary of 
the info-rmation for the calculation of DD appears in Table 
2. 
TABLE 2 
Description and rating for defense demand of pripro responses 
Rating Description Explanation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
No apparent need for 
defense 
Slight need for 
defense 
Moderate need for 
defense 
Considerable need 
for defense 
Gr~at need for 
defense 
Greatest need for 
defense 
Aspects of pripro con-
tained only implictly 
Only slight tension 
aroused; includes level 
2 content or formal 
scores 
Arousal of moderate 
tension; includes comr 
binations of level 1 
content and level 2 
formal scores or vice 
versa 
Responses like reference 
to sex organs; also com-
binations of level 1 
content and level 1 
formal scores 
Shocking ideas implying 
breach of judgment; 
availability of ideas 
usually kept unconscious 
Responses usually ~n 
psychotic records 
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Holt's system of fo rm level scores is similar to 
that d~scribed py Mayman (1960) with the exception that 
Fv score has been split into Fv and Fa. Form level was 
scored for all the responses in the record. It was re-
presented as being the total number of ~11 form level 
scores over the total number of responses in the record. 
A brief summary of the information for the calculation of 
the form lev~l s9ores appears in Tabl~ 3. 
TAB~E 3 
Description and rating of form level scpres 
Rating Type Description 
+2 
+1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
F+ 
Fo 
Fw+ 
Fw-
Fv 
Fa 
Fs 
Sharp convincing forms easily seen 
Popular and near popular forms 
Reasonably plausible but not very 
convincing forms 
Forms bearing only a slight resemblance 
Vague, non-definitive forms 
Amorphous forms in which form plays no 
role 
Spoiled form responses where a familiar 
and good response is given but some 
specification is added which lowers the 
acceptability of the response as a whole. 
The final scoring section is called the creativeness 
score. All the responses in the record we r e scored for 
creativeness and the score is represented as the sum of 
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the creativeness ratings over the total number of response<;. 
A brief summary of information for the calculation of th e 
creativeness score appears in Taqle 4. 
TAB~E; 4 
Brief ~escrip~ian of the ratings of creativeness 
Rating Desc ription Elaboratic;m 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4.5.2 
Distinctly original 
creative response 
Moderately original 
creative response 
Unusual but not 
original 
Unoriginal response 
Definitive form with 
accuracy and richness 
of quality 
Clearly out of th~ 
ordinary; good e l abor-
ation with use of 
colour, movement and 
shading 
Unusual area with 
rich elaboration 
Without richne::>s 
1 Rorschac~ determinants as m~asures of the d,egree of control 
Whi lst the Rorschach n•cord of each subject was scor-
ed i n its entirety, certain determinants were regards as 
being more s uitable than others for us e as indicators of 
the idea of degree of control of respons e . The rational.-! 
2 for this has been Jllltcd abuve. 
I. See Appendi:: E, p. 148 for response areas used with 
Rorschach t est , 
2 . Seep. 63-67 . 
(a) M% 
Piotrowski (1957) says that it is best to score 
as M all responses plainly indicating overt movement, 
definitive postures, or any kind of muscular tension, 
including attempts at refraining from tension and 
effort. Good quality M presuppose a distinct human-
l ike form that behaves like a living organism. The 
response must be accompanied by kinesthetic innervat-
ion on the part of the subject. This requirement is 
met, according to Piotrowski, when the subject gives 
as a response, somebody moving, doing something, exert-
ing force to prevent any overt movement or carrying out 
overt movements. M% is calculated by the total number 
o f M r esponses divided by the total number of responses 
and bri nging it to a percentage . 
(b) M/FM 
The scoring of the M as part of this ratio has 
already been described above. Piotrowski (1957) says 
t hat FM is scored when the r esponse describes ani mals 
1n a pose that 1s typical of an animal. The response 
is accompanied by a feeling that muscular tension is 
changing, or has become fixed. The M/FM score cons1-
sted of the number of M in the record in relation to 
the number of FM. 
(c) FC% 
The FC response is scored when a plausibly 
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perceived form has an acceptable colour accompaniment. 
FC% was calculated by dividing the number of FC in the 
record by the total number of responses and bringing the 
result to a percentage. 
(d) FC/CF+C 
CF is scored wherL colour in the first instance 
.suggests itself to the subject and then secondly, form 
is used to give shape to the colour. In the pure C 
response colour is used but no consideration is given 
to form. The FC/CF+C score consisted of the number of 
FC in relation to the sum of the number of CF and C. 
(e) C' /c 
The C' of this ratio 1s scored in a record where 
there is perception of dark or black and when the dark 
and black contribute in a meaningful way to the content 
of a response. C' was also scored when a meaningful 
response contained a suggestion of disgust or repulsion. 
The c of the ratio was scored when an area of the 
response were seen as different in brightness from the 
adjacent area. It had reference to the texture of an 
area. The C'/c score consisted of the number of C' 
responses in the record in relation to the number of c. 
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(f) F+% 
The frequency tables of Beck (1950) were used 
to establish which responses could be regarded as being 
of high quality or accurate pure form. The way that the· 
subject elaborated on the form response in the inquiry 
was part i cularly noted. In the case of a response scor-
ed F-, confusion or lack of elaboration was often noted. 
The F+% score was calculated in the same way as in Beck 
(1950) viz., the total number ofF+ over the sum of the 
F+ and the F- times 100. 
4 . 5.3 Scoring of feedback error on the modified vers~on of 
the Moede two-hand motor co-ordination apparatus 
The two tasks that were carried out on the modi-
fied version of the Moede two-hand motor co-ordination 
apparatus were described as firstly, the normal feed-
back task and secondly, the diminished feedback task. 
It was in the latter task that the hand-wheel controls 
operated freely to the extent of one-and-a-half turns 
owing to the loosening of the collar . The subject was 
given five trials in each task, and each trial was 
scored according to errors. Errors were taken as hav-
ing occurred when the line traced by the cursor touched 
either boundary of the pathway anywhere from the start 
to the finish. At times however, the touch was so 
slight as to be doubtful, in which case only ,5 error 
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was scored. Where the line left the pathway, an error 
was scored at the point of exit and another at the 
point of re-entry. Finally, it might happen than in-
stead of immediately attempting to return to the path-
way, the line continued for some distance outside the 
pathway, then the subject was penalized at the rate of 
,5 error for every ,25 ' length of an inch of line out-
side. The following is an example of a score on one 
trial: 
Clear errors 
Doubtful errors 
Times when exit and re-entry 
occurred 
Length of line outside pathway 
Total error score 
7 
3 
1 
,75" 
12,0 
The feedback error score was calculated as the 
mean of the normal feedback score subtracted from the 
mean of the diminished feedback score. 
4.5.4 Description of the accident liability 
It was possible to establish a reliable criter-
ion score for the research study . It has already been 
suggested above that that study centred around a sample 
of drivers about whom necessary data could be obtained 
with relative facility. This included records of the 
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accident involvement of the drivers. These records 
contained the description of the accident, its seri-
ousness, and the date on which it occurred. It was 
also established what the exact driving exposure 
time in days and months had been for each driver. 
It wa~ confirmed that they had as far as possible 
been subjected to the same driving routes. These 
' considerations were basically those which Shaw and 
Siche l (1971) used in their discussion of the reli-
ability of a criterion score for accident liability. 
The work of Shaw and Sichel is important because 
they proved the reliability of the criterion score 
and made it possible for the calculation of accident 
liability score to be used in other studies. Shaw 
and Sichel suggested that in order to make progress 
in the study of the personal factor in ac~idents, 
statistical methods should be devised which comply 
with certain requirements. The accident history of 
one individual should not, for instance, have any 
influence on the statistical analysis of the acci-
dents of another dirver. The statistics should be 
capable of testing the hypothesis of constant lia-
bility within the individual even though the liabi-
lity is not necessarily related to the personal 
compone~t alone . They went on to describe the 
earlier efforts to obtain a criterion which would 
have shown the degree of accident liability. Earlier 
lao 
work suggested that the potential for accidents could be 
measured by a negative binomial dis tribution law. This 
first statistical determination of accidents as suggest-
ed by Greenwood (1919) was considered as a significant 
advance in accident theory. The suitability of these 
first statistics was, however, short-lived. 
There followed attempts to establish accident 
liabil i fy 1n terms of the correlation of the number of 
accidents 1n two short periods of time for a group of 
individuals. It was noted here that when there were a 
few persons with a large number of accidents in both 
periods, the correlation was very high. If these few 
were excluded, the correlations dropped considerably. 
It was with the realization of these earlier 
shortcomings in statistical method that Shaw and Sichel 
proposed the following accident liability criterion 
which was also used in this project. 
Data was obtained for each person as follows: 
(a) The length of exposure time to accident risk 
measured in actual driving days; 
(b) the number of accidents which occurred during 
the exposure time; 
(c) the dates when the accidents occurred. 
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The accident liability score was then calculated 
as follows: 
t 
l 
r + z + c 
where 
t accident liability score 
l the l~ngth of exposure to risk 
r = the number of accidents during 
the exposure time 
z 5/8 = the rectangular random 
deviate, 0 z l 
c = 3/8 a constant which will 
reduce the negative bias of 
estimator t 
An advantage of this method is the fact that it 
is not only the long seasoned drivers that need be ~n-
eluded in the sample but also those who have been dis-
charged early after their training period has come to 
an end . As the authors of the method rightly suggest 
it is in the latter group that one ~s go~ng to find 
characteristics which might be more related to the 
accident liability score than those found with the more 
seasoned drivers. It should be pointed, however, that 
a good driver might have a short record also, for he 
might leave on promotion or to another type of work. 
In their calculation of the reliability of this 
measure, Shaw and Sichel took 193 dr ivers who had had 
four or more accidents. All 193 men wer e exposed to 
the same environmental conditions. The exposure l ength 
for each driver was divided into equal parts and from 
the number of accidents incurred 1n each half, the es t i -
mates ti and t 2 were obtained. The reliability coeffici-
ents was equal to .85. 
The term "accident" needed definition in this re-
search. Discussion by the writer with the authorities 
of the Company where the research was conducted led to 
the conclusion that an accident could be defined as for 
instance, according to Arbous and Kerrich (1951). These 
authors indicated "an accident occurred when in a chain 
of events, each of which is planned or controlled, there 
occurs an unplanned event, which being the result of 
some non-adjus t ive act on the part of the individual may 
or may nor result in injury." There might of course, 
not be injury but damage to property or delay in continu-
ing a journey. 
4.6 The statistical model 
The results of the study were evaluated 1n the follow-
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1 ing way: 
(a) The establishment of an intercorrelation 
matrix of the test score and the accident 
reliability score. A level of significance 
for the correlation coefficients was calcu-
lated; 
(b) The choice of a regression equation of the 
best battery of predictors; 
(c) Calculation of the means and standard de-
viation scores for the accident liability 
score and for the best battery of predict-
ors; 
(d) A comparison of the estimates of the acc1-
dent liability score with the observed 
values; 
(e) The calculation of the standard error of 
estimate . 
1. The calculations were performed on a Data General 
Corporation Nova Computer at the Department of 
Engineering at the University of Durban-Westville, 
Dur ban. Prof. F . Calitz, M. Com. (Stell.) D.Com. (S.A.) 
Head of the Department of Statistics, University of 
Durban-Westville, Durban, assisted the writer with 
the writing of the programmes, the computations, 
and the co-ordination of results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
5.1 General 
The results of the study were portrayed in two ways. In 
the first instance, there were three sets of scores, which re-
presented the results of tests done with the subjects. Secondly, 
there were the results of calculations which made use of these 
sets of scores, and which formed par t of the s t atisti ca l eval u-
ation of the study . 
5.2 Test results 
The tes t results included firstly, those scores pertaining 
to Holt's system of Rorschach measures for primary process think-
ing; secondly, those scores pertaining to Rorschach determinants 
which reflected degree of control; and thirdly, the score calcu-
lated f rom the measures on the modified version of the Moede two-
hand motor co-ordination test which reflected feedback error. 
5 . 2.1 Scores relating to Holt's system of Rorschach measures 
for primary process thinking 
The abbreviated form used for each measure ~s 
g~ven ~n the following list of Rorschach measures for 
primary process thinking: 
(a) Content (Co) 
(b) Aggression (Agg) 
(c) Formal characteristics (Fo) 
(d) Percentage primary process thinking 
(% Pripro) 
(e) Defense effectiveness (DE) 
(f) Defense demand (DD) 
(g) Form level (FL) 
(h) Creativeness (Cr) 
Scores for each subject according to this scheme 
appear in Table 5. 
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TABLE 5 
Scores on Holt's system of Rorschach measures 
for primary process thinking 
Sub- Co Agg Fo Pri- DE DD FL Cr ject pro 
1 ,40 ,20 ,24 52 ,29 3,9 ,65 2,8 
2 , 39 ,20 ,25 52 ,23 1,6 ,27 3,3 
3 ,54 ,35 ,20 62 ,66 2,1 ,52 3,5 
4 ,24 ,21 ,50 70 ,28 2,0 ,59 3,5 
5 ,39 ,18 ,52 65 ,20 2,7 ,43 3,5 
6 ,2 7 ,21 ,16 45 ,41 1,3 ,64 3,1 
7 '39 , 34 ,43 71 ,31 2,1 , 68 3,6 
8 ,28 ,26 ,06 32 ,75 ,62 ,40 3,4 
9 ,40 ,24 ,66 87 ,32 3,1 ,89 3,0 
10 ,65 ,30 ,09 70 '26 2,2 ,48 3,3 
11 ,27 '24 ,19 50 ,55 1,1 ,58 3,7 
12 ,48 ,44 ,16 64 '38 2,0 ,40 3,0 
13 ,23 ,21 ,17 36 '76 , 93 , 36 3,3 
14 ,59 ,23 ,53 67 '24 2,20 ,96 3,5 
15 , 52 ,44 ,19 67 ,27 2,00 ,77 3,5 
16 ,42 ,31 ,09 46 ,52 1,50 ,73 3,2 
17 ,56 ,25 ,14 58 ,30 2,00 ,51 3,1 
18 ,43 ,24 ,66 76 '06 3,00 ,71 4,0 
19 ,46 '35 ,22 60 , 36 2,00 1,30 3,4 
20 ,40 '31 ,20 67 ,27 1,80 ,82 3,4 
21 ,50 ,25 ,44 69 ,23 2,80 ,94 3,8 
22 ,29 ,16 ,03 31 ,77 ,53 ,62 3,6 
23 ,62 ,26 ,31 76 ,25 2,90 ,56 3,7 
2Lf ,46 , 34 ,32 68 ,23 2,70 ,46 3,5 
25 ,40 ,24 ,06 44 ,31 ,94 ,20 3,6 
26 ,32 ,18 ,17 50 ,53 1,10 ,21 3,0 
27 ,30 ,18 ,04 34 ,60 ,70 ,48 3,4 
28 ,46 ,16 ,14 38 ,58 '82 '68 3,4 
29 ,22 ,12 ,20 42 ,35 1,00 ,60 3,5 
30 ,36 ,17 ,18 47 ,63 1,10 ,53 3,2 
31 ,41 ,30 ,11 48 ,54 1,20 '37 3,3 
32 ,32 ,25 ,08 37 ,73 ,83 ,30 3 ,o 
33 ,34 ,21 ,13 45 ,81 ,96 ,24 3,6 
34 ,42 ,25 ,48 63 ,31 3,40 ,56 3 ,5 
35 ,52 ,34 ,14 62 ,42 1,70 ,66 3,2 
36 ,31 ,26 ,09 40 ,76 ,90 ,26 3,7 
37 ,27 ,20 ,13 36 ,47 1,00 ,58 3,1 
38 ,29 ,11 , 21 36 , 6 7 ,61 ,25 3,5 
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5.2.2 Scores relating to Rorschach determinants 
Selected Rorschach determinants were used to indi-
cate the degree of control exercised by the subject. The 
scores for each subject are shown ~n Table 6 . 
TABLE 6 
Subject scores of selected Rorschach determinants 
Sub- M% M/FM FC% FC/CF+C C' /c F+% ject 
1 7 ,75 13 1,25 1,75 71 
2 8 ,25 7 3,00 ,60 63 
3 7 ,80 15 2,00 6,00 70 
4 4 , 16 6 3,00 2,00 64 
5 2 ,10 2 ,so ,20 60 
6 6 ,43 20 2,00 2,50 79 
7 5 ,10 2 ,50 ,60 66 
8 10 ,50 9 4,00 ,14 83 
9 5 ,50 3 ,25 2,00 74 
10 8 ,33 4 ,34 ,80 "60 
ll 4 ,10 8 2,00 1,00 70 
12 6 3,00 10 5,00 1,10 80 
13 13 ,66 11 3,50 ,80 87 
14 7 ,43 9 ,80 1,43 68 
15 7 ,43 14 2,30 ,86 77 
16 2 ,14 10 1,25 2,50 80 
17 14 ,80 12 1,20 2,50 74 
18 4 ,14 4 1,00 2,00 63 
19 2 ,14 10 1,00 1,30 68 
20 12 ,43 6 3,00 '75 66 
21 3 ,17 6 ,66 1,00 63 
22 18 3,00 10 2,50 ,20 82 
23 10 1,00 10 4,00 ,40 60 
24 5 ,16 8 1,50 2,30 60 
25 12 ,60 16 8,00 ,50 76 
26 17 ,90 14 2,50 ,40 83 
27 18 1,50 12 3,00 2,00 76 
28 8 ,60 20 10,00 ,40 87 
29 22 1,60 8 1,00 1,30 77 
30 11 , 75 21 11,00 2,70 78 
31 8 ,67 23 3,50 2,00 81 
32 8 1,00 16 6,00 1,00 78 
33 16 1,30 16 2,00 1,60 83 
34 2 ,06 11 5,00 ,80 66 
35 4 ,30 22 5,50 1,60 73 
36 7 1,50 12 2,50 1,50 75 
37 18 ,60 9 ,80 1,20 71 
38 12 ,80 16 2,60 ,30 76 
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5. 2.3 Score relating to the modified vers1on of the Moede two-
hand motor co-ordination test 
The above-mentioned apparatus was used to ascertain 
the effect of diminished feedback on the performance of 
the subjects. The scores for the test appear in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
Scores on modified vers1on of the Moede two-hand 
motor co-or~ination test 
Subject Normal Diminished Feedback Feedback Feedback Error 
l 7,7 13,6 5,9 
2 8,3 13,1 4,8 
3 12,1 17,3 5,2 
4 11,3 18,5 7,2 
5 8,2 19,0 10,8 
6 12,1 23,2 11,1 
7 9,7 19,9 10,2 
8 4,3 8,6 4,3 
9 9,5 17,5 8,0 
10 13,7 21,3 7,6 
11 8,6 13,7 5,1 
12 12,1 20,4 8,3 
13 3,7 7,9 4,2 
14 11,3 16,4 5,1 
15 13,8 22,4 8,6 
16 . 15,8 21,9 6,1 
17 14,0 18,8 4,8 
18 10,8 15,7 4,9 
19 11' 3 17,9 6,6 
20 7,0 13,9 .. 6,9 
21 7,2 11,1 3,9 
22 7,0 10,2 3,2 
23 15,7 20,9 5,2 
24 7,4 14,2 6,8 
25 6,0 9,7 3,7 
26 10,9 13,3 2,4 
27 8,3 10,8 2,5 
28 10,5 12,8 2,3 
29 10,7 13,3 2,6 
30 8,8 10,9 2,1 
31 11,6 14,5 2,9 
32 10,3 14,9 4,6 
33 9,2 11,9 2,7 
34 12,5 17,7 5,2 
35 10,4 16,5 6,1 
36 6,6 11' 3 4,7 
37 11,1 14,2 3,1 
38 12,6 14,8 2,2 
5.3 Results of the statistical calculations 
in: 
The results of the statistical calculations were embodied 
(a) an intercorrelation matrix of the test scores 
and the accident liability score: 
(b) regre ssion equations for 
(i) the battery of best predictors of the 
accident liability score (selected 
from 14 scores exclusive of the pripro 
score), 
(ii) the battery of best predictors of the 
accident liability score (selected 
from 15 scores inclusive of pripro as 
a score), 
(iii) pripro as the only predictor of the 
accident liability score; 
(c ) the means and standard deviations for the acc1-
dent liability score and the best predictor 
scores; 
(d) a comparison of the estimates of the accident 
liability score with the observed values . 
5.3.1 The intercorrelation matrix 
The intercorrelation matrix included eight 
scores from Holt's system of Rorschach measures for 
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primary process thinking; s~x scores of the selected 
Rorschach determinants; one score for feedback error 
(FE), and the accident liability score . The correl-
a tions which are significant at the 5% level are indi-
cated in Table 8. 
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t Co Agg 
t X 
Co -,612 X 
Agg -,410 ,510 X 
Fo -,702 
%PP 
-,935 ,627 ,478 
DE ,847 
-,492 
DD -,764 ,505 
FL ,477 
-,325 
Cr 
M% ,571 
-,378 -,492 
M/FM '61 1 -,307 -,438 
FC% ,478 
FC/CF ,308 
+C 
C'c 
F+% ,782 
-,431 
FE -,576 ,533 
TABLE 8 
M/FM FC/CF Fo %PP DE DD FL Cr M% FC% +( 
X 
,744 X 
-,636 -,768 X 
,693 ,725 
-,722 X 
-,408 
-,461 ,425 -,473 X 
X 
-,498 -,562 ,401 -,562 ,382 X 
-,466 -,541 ,563 
-,540 ,726 X 
-,557 
-,489 ,494 
-,455 X 
-,337 -,335 ,318 
-,459 X 
-,586 -,696 ,740 
-,602 
-,337 ,446 ,449 ,608 ,405 
,376 ,582 -,502 ,510 -,324 ,605 
-,498 -,402 -,375 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF SCORES OF TEST BATTERY WHICH ARE 
SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL 
C'/c 
-
X 
X 
-,418 X 
N 
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5.3.2 Selection of batteries of the best predictors and their 
regression equations 
The two batteries of best predictors of the accident 
liability score are indicated in the tables which follow . 
As was mentioned above, the first battery of scores does 
not include pripro as a s core . It was f el t necessary to 
note whether any of the subscores in primary process think-
ing measures could play as strong a role as the composite 
score itself, i.e., the pripro score . In the second batt-
ery pripro as a score is included with the 14 others. 
TABLE 9 
Batte ry of best predictors of the accident liability 
score selected from 14 predictors 
Predictor Mean SD 2 (in rank order) r 
DE ,437 ,199 ,718982 
M% 8,737 5,179 '776325 
F+% 72,842 7,889 ,802025 
Co ,398 ,110 ,824138 
Fo ,235 ,168 ,849047 
Cr 3,397 '24 7 ,869637 
Agg ,247 ,007 ,885069 
C' /c 1, 263 , 743 ,885367 
FC/CF+C 2,892 2,486 ,885659 
Mean ~ = 122,053 SD = 42,003 
The regression equation for this battery is: 
X o -71,49x1 -114,373x2 -97, 5739x3 +42,6686x5 
+28,8102x8 -0,249645x9 -1,15387x12 -3,77248x13 
+2,0582lx14 -54,5052 
where X = the estimated score for the criterion, and 
0 
xl the observed score on Co 
x2 
II II II II Agg 
x3 " 
II 
" 
II Fo 
x5 = II " " II DE 
x8 = " 
II II II Cr 
X9 " " " 
II Mi. 
xl2 = 
II II II II FC/CF+C 
xl3 = 
II II II II C'/c 
xl4 " 
II 
" 
II F+i. 
TABLE 10 
Battery of best predictors of the accident liability score 
selected from 15 predictors 
Predictor Mean SD 2 (in rank order) r 
Pripro 54,289 14,497 ,8905 
DE ,437 ,199 ,925655 
F+i. 72,842 7,889 ,93396 
Cr 3,397 ,247 ,944596 
FC/CF+C 2,892 2,486 ,947234 
FL ,558 ,232 , 949077 
M/FM ,632 ,566 ,949348 
Mean t = 122,053 SD = 42,003 
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The regression equation for this battery is: 
X = 1,75216x4 + 31,5595x5 - 12,07x7 + 0 
20,6788x8 + 4,08045x10 - 1,1933lx12 + 
1,47274x14 + 33,4555 
where X ::a the estimated score for the criterion and 
0 
x4 = the observed value on pripro 
x5 II 
II II 
" DE 
x7 = 
II 
" " " FL 
x8 = " " " " Cr 
xlO= " " II " M/FM 
x12= " " " II FC/CF+C 
xl4= " " " II F+% 
5.3.3 Regression equation with pr~pro as the only predictor 
Because of the strength of the pr~pro score, as 
noticed both in the intercorrelation matrix and in the 
battery of best predictors of accident liability score 
selected from 15 scores, a regression equation was cal-
culated for pr~pro as the only predictor. In this way, 
pripro as a predictor was compared with the two previous 
batteries of predictors. 
The regression equation is: 
X
0 
=- 2,70812x4 + 269,075 
where X = the estimated score for the 
0 
criterion and 
x4 the observed score on pripro. 
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5.3.4 A comparison of the estimates of the c riterion with the 
vbse;rved v,:tlues 
To test the prediction properties of each of th~ 
three above equations, the estimated criterion according 
to each o f the three regression equations was calculated 
for each of the thirty-eight s uhjec~s. 
with the observed criterion score . The results are indi-
cated in t ables 11, 12, and 13. 
j 1 h 
TABLE 11 
A comparison of the estimates of the criterion 
with the observed values 
Regression equation no 1 
Observed Estimate Error of Estimate 
score no. 1 no. 1 
102 99,990 2,010 
90 97,178 7,178 
101 120,253 19,253 
84 88,035 4,035 
90 77,319 12,681 
135 142,730 7,730 
64 85,467 21,467 
212 183,033 28,967 
65 68,361 3,361 
73 80,185 7,185 
124 147,265 23,265 
103 101,128 1,872 
180 184,710 4, 710 
81 68,378 12,622 
llO 102,649 7,351 
140 138,954 1,046 
109 103,316 5,684 
73 60,676 12,324 
85 97,829 12,829 
89 97,957 8,957 
87 81,901 5,099 
200 200,748 ,748 
70 73,323 3,323 
77 64,985 12,015 
139 142,850 3,850 
139 156,682 17,682 
190 164,037 25,963 
160 167,371 7,371 
145 159,229 14,229 
128 136,741 8,741 
151 142,388 8,612 
181 163,169 17,831 
164 181,257 17,257 
82 80,658 1,342 
108 102,755 5,245 
168 167 , 915 ,085 
150 136' 188 13' 812 
189 170,411 18,589 
Theoretical standard error of estimate (see Appendix D) 
= 12.57 
Observed standard error of estimate = 12.57 
117 
TABLE 12 
A comparison of the estimates of the criterion 
with the observed values 
Regression equation no 2 
Observed Estimate Error of Estimate 
score no. 2 no. 2 
102 107,684 5,684 
90 104,806 14,806 
101 115,720 14' 720 
84 76,224 7' 776 
90 81,238 8,762 
135 139,642 4,642 
64 82,084 18,084 
212 186,040 25,960 
65 53,135 11,865 
73 70,761 2,239 
124 133,829 9,829 
103 103,595 ,595 
180 184,903 4,903 
81 85,370 4,370 
110 100,075 9,925 
140 143,587 3,587 
109 110,062 1,062 
73 68,491 4,509 
85 93,828 8,828 
89 80,368 8,632 
87 79,737 7,263 
200 200,422 ,422 
70 65,605 4,395 
77 75 ,618 1,382 
139 143,004 4,004 
139 145,002 6,002 
190 171 ,801 18,199 
160 165,922 5,922 
145 154,781 9,781 
128 135,569 7,569 
151 148,017 2,983 
181 170,145 10,855 
164 176,874 12,874 
82 89. 9'49 7,949 
108 98,453 9,547 
168 174,320 6,320 
150 148,372 1,628 
189 172,971 16,029 
Theoretical standard error of estimate (see Appendix D) 
= 9 . 72 
Observed standard error of estimate= 9.72 
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TABLE 13 
A comp~rison of the estimates of the criterion 
with the observed values 
Regression equation no 3 
Observed Estimate Error of estitllate 
score no. 3 no. 3 
102 128,253 26 '253 
90 128,253 38,253 
101 101,172 ,172 
84 79,507 4,493 
90 93,047 3,047 
135 147,210 12,210 
64 76,799 12,799 
212 182,415 29,585 
65 33,469 31,531 
73 79,507 6,507 
124 133' 669 9,669 
103 95,755 7,245 
180 171,583 8,417 
81 87,631 6,631 
110 87,631 22,369 
140 144,501 4,501 
109 112,004 3,004 
73 63,258 9,742 
85 106,588 21,588 
89 87,631 1,369 
87 82,215 4,785 
200 185,123 14' 877 
70 63,258 6,742 
77 84,923 7,923 
139 149,918 10,918 
139 133,669 5,331 
190 176,999 13,001 
160 166,166 6,166 
145 155,334 10,334 
128 141,793 13,793 
151 139,085 11 '915 
181 168,875 12,125 
164 147,210 16,790 
82 98,463 16,463 
108 101,172 6,828 
168 160,750 7,250 
150 171,583 21,583 
189 171,583 17,417 
Theoretical standard error of estimate (see Appendix D) 
:;:: 14,93 
Observed standard error of estimate = 14,93 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1 General 
The resul t s obtained in the study were considered in 
terms of the specific hypotheses, found in section 4 . 2. 2 on 
page 
6,1.1 AcGident liability and primary process dominance 
This hypothesis (H1) related accident liability 
to primary process dominance. The primary process domi-
nance was inferred from Rorschach measure, viz., Holt's 
system of primary process scores. It stated that high 
accident liability was correlated with 
1 . High primary process scores 
ii. High content scores 
111. High f ormal scores 
1V. Low creativity scores 
v. Low form level scores 
vi. High aggression scores 
vii. High defense demand 
viii . Low defense effectiveness . 
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The following significant coefficients of correl-
ation were found: 
Score Correlation 1 with t 
Co -,612 
Agg -,410 
Fo -,702 
%P -,935 p 
DE ,847 
DD -,764 
FL ,4 77 
(a) Co, in its turn was found t o be $ignificantly 
correlated with the following: 
Score Correlation with Co 
Agg ,510 
% Pripro ,627 
DE -,492 
DD ,505 
FL ,325 
M% -,378 
M/FM -,307 
F+% -,431 
1 . Significant at the 5% level . 
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(b) Agg, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated with the following : 
Score Correlation with Agg 
% Pripr o ,478 
M% -,492 
M/FM -,438 
Co ,510 
(c) Fo, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated wi th the following: 
Score Correlation with Fo 
% Pripro , 744 
DE -,636 
DD , 693 
FL -,408 
M% -,498 
M/FM -,466 
FC% -, 557 
FC/CF+C -,337 
F+% -,586 
(d) % Pripro, in its turn was found to be signifi-
cantly corre lated with the following: 
Score 
DE 
DD 
FL 
Corre lation with Pripro % 
-, 768 
,725 
,461 
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(d) continued .... . 
Score Correlation with Pripro % 
M% -,562 
M/FM -,541 
FC% -,489 
FC/CF+C -,335 
F+% -,696 
(e) DE, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated with the following: 
Score Correlation with DE 
DD 
- '722 
FL ,425 
tf% ,401 
M/FM ,563 
FC% ,494 
FC/CF+G ,318 
F+% ,740 
(f) DD, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated with the following: 
Score Correlation with DD 
Co ,505 
Fo ,693 
% Pripro ,725 
DE -,722 
FL -,473 
M% -,562 
(f) continued ..... 
Score Correlation with DD 
M/FM -,540 
FC% -,435 
FC/CF+C -, 459 
F+% -,602 
The accident liability score (c) was low when the 
driver had a large number of accidents, and viae versaJ 
high when the driver was relatively accident free. 
The negative correlation with Co implied that 
liability to have accidents was increased as the number 
of drive-dominated responses in the record of the subj-
ect increased. Klein (1956) said: 
"If experimental conditions are those 
that produce the dominance of an ex-
autive intentionJ the opportunity is 
diminished for more peripheral active 
intentions to project themse lves in 
behaviour. 11 (Klein, 1956, p. 158) 
In a similar way the conclusion can be made that 
primary process thinking which is peripheral to the 
executive intent, could overwhelm, to speak the langua-
ge of Klein, the phenomenal reality and the reaction to 
the percept. The possibility exists that drivers who 
have frequent accidents cannot cope with the interfer-
ence of peripheral unconscious material and their 
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manner of adaptation is not as good as it should be. 
The Fo (formal characteristics of the response) 
also correlated with t to the extent of -,702. The 
formal characteristics of the response referr~d to 
the perceptual and language aspects of the primary 
process r esponse, or i n other words the conceptual 
framework of the response. Subjects who scored a high 
t, were not so completely dominated by the perceptual 
configuration that they were no longer capable of cri-
tical control of the percept. Fo meant that the subj-
ect either distanciated himself from the percept to 
such a degree that his interpretation of it was absurd, 
or otherwi se he was so involved in the percept that h e 
was not able to separate himself from it. In such a 
case the r e was also the tendency to turn the stimulus 
i n the Ror schach test into a reality both conceptually 
and affectively . A subject might hqve said that he was 
a fraid the crocodile (seen in the card) would bite him. 
Aggression (Agg), the third measure in the compo-
site primary process percentage score (Pripro), corre-
lated negatively with t (r = -,410). In the light of 
t he literature such a correlation was expected. Parry 
(1968) suggested that aggression might be an important 
factor in accident repetition. Holt (1968) stated that 
agg r ession probably played an important role in the 
125 
dynamics of maladjustment. Aggression as a phenomenon 
still remains a problem for the scientist. The question 
has repeatedly been asked whether aggression is an in-
born biological urge which becomes manifest in violent 
or anti-social behaviour, or it is learned as a response 
to environmental conditions. It is also necessary to 
know if adequate control would prevent aggression from 
breaking through into overt acts of hostility. Present 
day theorists have even suggested that an extra Y chromo-
some in man might be responsible for aggression. 
Silverman and Silverman (1963) have suggested that 
ego pathology which is seen in primary process thinking 
was specifically linked to the activation of aggression. 
The fact that aggression appeared to a great 
extent in the responses (note the correlation of ,510 
with content) could indicate the great amount of tension 
of aggression that existed within the subject . As such, 
it possibly played a part in the maladaptive regression 
of the subject, though neither DD or DE correlated signi-
ficantly with Agg. The correlation of aggression with 
total pripro percentage was ,478. Reference to the ·per-
ceptual model of Klein (1956) indicated the possibility 
that aggression existed as unspoken cognitive and 
affective reactions and also as unconscious fantasies 
in the reaction to the percept . In the light of this 
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model, mention could be made of the fact that there was 
a correlation between aggression and feedback error, the 
latter being the score in the feedback task that was 
given to the subjects. 
The comments made by Sandler (1971) were consider-
ed to be of significance to the above findings. In the 
first place, Sandler was not happy with the lack of 
description and explanation of the large variety of 
phenomena which were subsumed under the general heading 
of aggression. He felt that it was necessary to differ-
entiate between overt aggression and phenomena like the 
affects of rage and ~nger which did not seem to be entir-
ely drive-derivatives. The psychoanalytic school of 
thought had of course, postulated unconscious aggre$sive 
impulses to account for certain overt phenomena of aggre-
ssion, but in addition there was speculation about the 
role of aggression in its relation to mastery, motility, 
etc., (Joseph, 1973; Spitz, 1969). Spitz (1965) said: 
"We speak often enough of the aggressive 
drive but it is rarely spelled out that the 
aggressive drive is not limited to hostility. 
Indeed, by far the largest and most import-
ant part of the aggressive drive serves the 
nvtor of every movement, of aU activity, 
big and small and ultimately of life itself." 
(Spitz, 1965, p . 106) . 
Sandler (1971) pointed out that the introduction 
of a notion of the "capacity to be aggressive, which 
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might be considered as an inherited aspect in the human 
being. The capacity to be aggressive was mobilized . 
and used by the ego in relation to the attempts of the 
latter to avoid unpleasure. The capacity to be aggress-
ive could exist alongside aggression, which was defined 
as an instinctual drive. It could be that in the present 
research project, that both the concepts were encountered. 
The incidence of aggression in the % Pripro was regarded 
as being aggression of the instinctual type. Where a 
driver, however, got angry, as it were, with the appara-
tus or with the test material in front of him, it could 
have been regarded as an aggression which served mastery 
and adaptation rather than destruction. The two concepts 
might need more clarification in the future. 
It was also possible that Sandler's suggestions 
about the reduction of drive tension might be applied 1n 
the research. He specified that reduction of aggressive 
tension was achieved mainly by feedback, once the aim 
toward which the aggression had been directed, was ful-
filled. When feedback was decreased, or when there was 
no feedback there was lesser reduction of aggressive 
tension. It could be that this was the aggressive 
tension that was manifested in Co and Fo and which cor-
related with % Pripro positively and negatively with 
the t score. It could well be for this reason that FE 
correlated with aggression to the extent of ,533. Here 
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the driver who was less able at the mechanical task when 
feedback was diminished, revealed more aggression. There 
is no reason why the explanation of Spitz (1965) and 
Marcovitz (1973) should not also be considered here. The 
greater the threat offered by the intrusion of primary 
process thinking, the greater the attempt (cf . the corre-
lation with FE of ,533) by the driver to establish, main-
tain, and expand his boundaries. Marcovitz (1973) said: 
"This process never occurs in a vacuum 
but always at the interface of opposing 
forces which are always experienced as 
limiting gratification and growth and/ 
or as threatening injury or destruction. 
Asserting one's own boundaries is a 
basic mode of affirming continued 
existence. 11 (Marcovitz, 1973, p. 228) 
The libidinal, aggressive and formal characteristics 
constituted the primary process content. Percentage 
primary process became a very powerful s core. It correlat-
ed with f to the extent of -,935. Several possible reasons 
might be given to explain why this result was so high. In 
the first instance, the Rorschach as a test was conducive to 
primary process thinking. A number of reasons were mentioned 
in section 3.5.2 above to indicate the susceptibili.ty of the 
Rorschach to primary process thinking. In the second instance, 
primary process and secondary process thinking were considered 
to function within a dichotomy, and there was constant regress-
ion in serVice of the ego. A human being would always have 
primary process thinking with him~ just as surely as 
he would have an unconsc~ous structure of the mind. 
The intensity of the correlation would indicate a great-
er usage of primary process thinking where feedback is 
not very active. Noy (1969) pointed out that: 
" ... these 'ol-d programs' continue to exist 
and to regul-ate various unconscious cont-
ents. Their existence and activity are 
reveal-ed indirectl-y in such productions 
as dreams~ jokes, art and various psycho-
pathol-ogical- patterns of behaviour. They 
show no signs of being infl-uenced by real--
ity, and such basic conditions for real-ity 
adaptation as the concepts of time, space 
and causal-ity, etc., remain forever with-
out relevance for them. 
As they continue to organize mental con-
tents onl-y in terms of the sel-f, they are 
"labell-ed 'egocentric' or 'narcissistic' 
organizational- modes, and are regarded as 
contradictory to any social-ization and 
reality-orientated adjustment and develop-
ment. " (N oy , 19 6 9 , p . 1 7 4 ) 
Whereas % Pripro had reference to the amount of 
primary process thinking present, DD implied the in-
tensity of the primary process thinking in the record. 
It could possibly have been regarded as a more solid 
form of correlation with the £ score although it was of 
course also influenced by the amount of pripro in the 
record. Generally % Pripro and DD followed similar 
patterns as regards the intercorrelations. There was 
one exception, viz., DD did not show a correlation with 
Agg whereas % Pripro did. The records of the subjects 
contained many evidences of aggression but the aggress-
130 
ion responses were not of a high intensity as regards 
primary process thinking. The aggression was control!-
ed to a certain degre~ by the ego processes. (cf . 
Sandler, 1971, p. 14) 
Good drivers appeared to be better able to deal 
adaptively with the primary process tninking, when it 
occurred. The corre lation of DE with t was ,847. The 
DE correlations seemed to be an almost perfect comple-
ment to the % Pripro correlations. Schafer (1967) 
wrote: 
"Finally, on the subject of defense, 
t he pat ient 's defensive mobilization 
during t esting will tend to act as 
a major counterforce with respect to 
the creative regression previously 
considered. The interplay of the 
regressive and counter-regressive 
for ces is often dramat?.:c and instruc-
tive." (Schafer, 1967, p. 22) 
The FL score correlated well the f, (r = 
,477). The FL scores distinguished the various modes 
of reality adherence of the subject, and waa consider-
ed a good reflection of the personal style of the 
subject. The good form response indicated a wealth of 
past experiences, which supplied the subject with many 
associative poss ibilities to match with the perceptual 
impressions . They showed the sharpness and daring of 
the perceptual articulation of the subject as he coped 
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with the features of the blot. Finally, the subject 
had to make a strict critical assessment of the degree 
of congruence between his associations and the formal 
articulations of the blot area. Where the critical 
functions mentioned above were absent, the driver 
lacked good normal adjustment and this was reflected 
in his £ score. 
The Mayman Form Level Scoring System was incor-
porated by Holt (1969) into his scoring system for 
primary process thinking. As such it was considered 
in the first hypothesis. They were scored foT every 
response because as Rapaport (1968) maintained: 
"In almost any record, the number of 
times form alone is used as a determi-
nant by far exceeds the number of times 
any other determinant is used . .. a care-
ful consideration of the subject's use 
of form plays a crucial role in the 
evaluation of any Rorschach record." 
(Rapaport 1968, p. 338) 
The research proved that the relationship between 
the form responses scored by the above method and also 
by the F+% method of Beck (1950) with the formal reason-
ing and contact with reality of the subject, were far-
reaching. The results were indicate·d in the following 
table. 
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l'ABLE 14 
Comparison of F+% and FL correlations 
Score Correlation Correlation 
with F+% with FL 
t ,782 ,477 
Co -,431 -,325 
Agg -,174 -,278 
Fo -,586 -,408 
% Pripro -,696 -,461 
DE ,740 ,425 
DD -,602 -,473 
FL ,288 X 
Cr - , 337 -
M% ,446 ,382 
M/FM ,449 ,270 
FC% ,608 ,275 
FC/CF+C ,405 ,294 
C'/c - ,193 
F+% X ,288 
FE -,418 -,324 
Though a similar pattern of correlations followed 
for both determinants, it was readily apparent that 
except in the case of Agg, the FL correlations were some-
what lower than the F+% correlations. In the first 1n-
stance, the scoring of the FL response varied from re-
asonably plausible to popular in most cases with a re-
sort to extremes, i.e., sharp, and convincing on the one 
hand and vague and amorphous on the other hand, being 
somewhat rarer. This apparently made the score for the 
total record lower than in the case of the Beck system 
where the tendency was for more freedom with the F+ 
response depending on the adequacy of the description, 
and a tightening of the F- responses . The percentage 
score in the case F+ responses would then have been 
higher than in the case of the Mayman form level scor-
ing system. When the correlation of the Agg with F+% 
and with FL is considered, it might be that the FL 
correlation With Agg is higher because the qualitative 
scoring took aggressive involvement in the form of 
verbalizations into account .more often. Verbalization 
reflected the subjectivity of the response, and verbal-
izations in the FL-considered responses implied that 
the subject was either too close or too distant from 
the stimulus. 
There was more-liberality in scoring a response 
F+ (often the description given during the inquiry es-
tablished a response as an F+) and this might have 
caused the F+% to show higher correlations. 
Rapaport (1968) has suggested that: 
" ... when the F+% is too high, the critical 
controlling processes may have become 
rigid and intolerably accurate, rrrik.ing for 
a meagrenees of productivity and for rigid-
. i ty in thinking and behaviour. " 
(Rapaport 1968, p. 347) 
The negative correlation of the F+% (-,377) with 
Cr might imply that there was too liberal a scoring of 
F+%. 
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Creativeness as a score in the system of Rorschach 
measures for primary process thinking was explained in 
terms of regression in service of the ego . During re-
gression in service of the ego there occurred a partially 
controlled lowering of the level of psychic functioning 
to promote adaptation. Kris (1952) described the concept 
as being very much responsible for the creativity of the 
artist. During the inspirational stage, the artist is 
immersed in archaic and less stable content. He takes 
the regressive yield, critically scrutinizes it, selects 
and then synthesizes it to fit into the current reality 
situation. It has been pointed out that the subject 
doing the Rorschach t_est often did exactly the same with 
the unstructured stimuli. The responses obtained could 
then be studied in terms of their originality and creati-
vity . Should the criterion score in such a case be some 
artistic measure, it could well be said that the regress-
ion in service of the ego promotes creativity. In the 
case of drivers of vehicles there was no significant 
correlation with the creativeness score, except in the 
case of F+% (r = -,337). A possibility which might be 
considered in connection with the lack of correlation 
with creativeness was the fact that the range and 
description of the creativeness criterion were such 
that the scorer was impelled in most cases to use a 
rating of three or four points. Pine (1959} reported 
that generally the studies done in connection with 
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creativity showed no relation to the currently used 
measure of adaptive regression, i.e . , DDxDE/PPR, nor 
to the overall measures of the amount or control of 
the primary process . 
6.1.2 Accident liability and degree of control 
This hypothes i s (H2) related accident liability to 
the degree of control that the subject exercised in his 
Rorschach responses. The degree of control was inferred 
from selected Rorschach determinants. The hypothesis 
stated that high accident liability was correlated with 
i. Low M% 
ii. Low M/FM 
iii. Low FC% 
1V. Low FC/CF+C 
v. High C'/c 
V1. Low F+% 
The following s i gnificant coefficients of corre-
lation were found: 
Score 
M% 
M/FM 
FC% 
FC/CF+C 
F+% 
1. Significant at the 5% level 
Correlation1 with f 
,571 
,611 
,478 
,308 
,782 
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(a) M%, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated with the following : 
Score Correlation with M% 
Co -,378 
Agg -,492 
Fo -,498 
% Pr ipro -,562 
DE ,401 
DD - ,562 
FL ,382 
M/FM , 726 
F+% ,446 
(b) M/FM , in its turn was fpund to be significantly 
corre lated with the following: 
Score Carre lation with M/FM 
Co -, 307 
Agg -,438 
Fo - ,4hb 
% Pripro -,541 
DE ,563 
DD -,540 
M% , 726 
F+% ,449 
( c ) FC%, in its turn was found to be s~gnifican tly 
correlated with the following: 
Sco re 
Fo 
% Pripro 
DE 
DD 
F+% 
C:n r re I i.l t i un w i l h FC% 
-,557 
-, 489 
,494 
-,455 
,608 
(d) FC/CF+C, i n its turn was found t o be signifi-
cantly corr e lated with the following: 
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Score 
Fo 
i.Pripro 
DE 
DD 
F+i. 
Correlation with FC/CF+C 
-,337 
-,335 
,318 
-,459 
,405 
(e) F+%, in its turn was found to be significantly 
correlated with th~ following: 
Score Correlation with F+i. 
Co -,431 
Fo -,586 
i. Pripro -,696 
DE ,740 
DD -,602 
Cr -,337 
Mi. ,446 
M/FM ,449 
FC% ,608 
FC/CF+C ,405 
The accident liability score (t) correlated posi-
tively and significantly with all Rorschach determinants 
which were selected because in some way they indicated 
control of thinking. There was no exception, namely 
c.' /c, in which case it was assumed that C' /c indicated 
control over the outward manifestation of emotion. 
Consideration of M with regard to delay of grati-
fication has been studied by many writers. Frankle 
(1955), Mirin (1955) and Tolman and Meyer (1956) repor-
ted that subjects who produce many M resort to longer 
motor delays in their social adjustments. Rapaport 
(1968) have suggested that since many form elements and 
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their spatial relationships must be integrated by the 
associative process, and configurations other than those 
given in the inkblot must be anticipated, much delay 
is a prerequisite. Since the correlation of M with the 
t score is high (r = . 571) it was assumed that the good 
driver exerted a control over his thinking so that the 
entry or intrusion of too much primary process thinking 
was disallowed. The correlation of M% with % Pripro 
was -,562. 
The correlation of M/FM with M% was high, being 
,726. The pattern of correlations followed theM% 
pattern very closely, being slightly lower than the M% 
co rrelations in all but two cases. The correlation 
of M/FM with F+% was ,449 which was almost equival ent 
to the M:'l. and F+% correlation of ,446 . The similarity 
could have meant that the FM aspect played no part 
when M/FM and F+% were compared . The assertion was 
considered 1n the li ght of Piotrowski's (1957) state-
"ment that: 
"One of their actuaZ functions is to 
infZuence behaviour in states of 
diminished consciousness. The iso-
Zation of the FM action tendencies, 
which make their appearance in the 
Zess integrated states of conscious-
ness, from the personal-ity is not so 
great that other action tendencies 
do not infZuence them. " 
(Piotrowski, 1957, p. 198) 
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A possible conclusion was that both M% and F+% 
were both such powerful mod~s of critical control as 
to disallow entrance of effects of diminished conscious-
-qess. 
The comment that "the more stable the emotion, 
the better the form visualization" (Rorschach, 1942, 
p. 31) was borne out in the correlation of FC% with 
F+% (r = ,608). With the entry of determinants which 
indicated lability of emotion such as CF and C there 
was a reduction of the correlation to ,405. 
Wittenbo.rn (1950) suggested that the factorial 
composition of the FC response is quite different 
from the f actorial composition of the CF and C res-
ponse categories. He went on to say that as a result 
of his study he regarded the factorial composition of 
the FC response as more similar to the factorial com-
position of the human movement response than it is to 
the other colour response categories. The greater 
difference between the FC% correlations and the 
FC/CF+C correlations when compared to the lesser diff-
erence between M% and M/FM correlations support 
Wittenborn's remarks. 
The following statements by Wittenborn (1950) 
were considered appropriate to terminate the discuss-
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ion on the degree of control. He said: 
"It was inferred that some of the Rorsohaoh 
responses differed from eaoh other with 
respect to the degree of peroeptual control 
characterizing them. Although the exact 
nature of this control was not and is not 
clearly specified~ human movement responses 
and large detail responses were conoeived 
as involving a high order of perceptual 
control whilst whole responses and colour 
form responses were considered to be alike 
in that they involve a flexible peroeptuqZ 
approach requiring appreciably less pe~cep­
tual discipline. A low order of perceptual 
control is tentatively conceived as manifes-
ted by responses which are incautious~ possi-
bly spontaneous and or impulsive, to a degree 
whioh results in a relative disregard for or 
an unawareness of, the purely formal, Ziterat 
or concrete response possibilities. In order 
to apply this oonceptualization broadly, the 
pure colour, the pure texture, and the pure 
diffusion response categories may Qe added 
to the whole and the·oolour form response 
categories. Similarly, in order to broaden 
the tentatively conceived class of responses 
which express a high perceptual order~ the 
pure form responses and oth~r detail response 
categories are added to the human movement 
and large detail r•esponse categories. This 
hypothesis is proved by factor analysis. 
(Wittenborn, 1950, p. 266) 
6 .1.3 ~ccident liability and the amount of feedback 
This hypothesis (H3) related accident liability 
to the amount of feedback. The amount of feedback was 
inferred from the use in an experiment of a modified 
version of the Moede two-hand motor co-ordination 
apparqtus. It was quantitatively represented as the 
difference in the number of feedback errors made by a 
subject in two different experimental situations. The 
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hypothesis stated that high accident liability was 
related to high feedback error. 
The fol~owing significant coefficients of 
correlatiop were fo~nd: 
Score 
t 
Agg 
Fo 
7. Pripro 
DE 
DD 
FL 
Mi. 
M/FM 
FC% 
Fr./CF+C 
F+% 
Correlation1 with 
feedhn~k error (FE) 
-,5 76 
,533 
,376 
,582 
-,502 
,510 
-,324 
-,605 
-, 498 
- , 402 
- ,375 
-,418 
The FE score implied that a deprivation of kine-
sth~ ti c and visual stimulation in a two-hand motor co-
ordination task caused a difference in performance from 
that occurri ng when there was no attempt t o impose de-
privation. It was noted that different individuals 
responded different l y to such deprivation, and that 
differences here were consistent with other difference 
in other variables. 
Popular writing has made much of the effects of 
qeprivation on the human being . Many quips were made 
1 . Significant at the 1% level 
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about the astronauts for instance and what they said to 
passing bodies. Scientists like Hebb (1949) have em-
phasized the importance of environmental stimulation in 
the development and maintenance of normal behaviour. 
It has also been suggested that it was only in cases of 
severe deprivation that pathology occurred. Nevertheless, 
there has been general acceptance that there are critical 
time periods within which sensory accompaniments of a 
motor response must return to the nervous system for 
appropriate regulation. 
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Driving might be regarded as the adaptive consequence 
of the processing of perceptual information . Bad drivers 
according to the criterion used in the research made a 
larger number of errors (FE) than the better drivers. 
There was a good correlation of FE and % Pripro, namely, 
,582 . The primary process responses contained signifi-
cant amount of aggressive but little libidinal content. 
Aggression correlated with FE to the extent of ,533 and 
there was no Co significant correlation. From the Fo 
correlation of ,376 it would appear that the extent of 
the involvement of the driver in h~s task was important. 
Where the driver appeared either too distant from his 
objects or too closely involved with the objects, there 
was no opportunity for the correct critical control, 
and he drove badly. Quenalt (1968) suggested that saf~ 
drivers were those who were fully aware of all the 
relevant information as they drove, whereas the dis-
sociated drivers showed a neglect of relevant presented 
information. 
M% correlated the highest with FE. (r = -,605). 
Many studies have appeared since 1952 concerning the 
relationship of M to thought, action and delay capacity. 
Singer (1955) suggested that impulse delay, emphatic 
motion perception, fantasy, and thinking were interdepen-
dent processes. In the test situation in the present 
research it was noticed that those drivers who did the 
~st amount of turning of the hanqwheels, were thos~ 
who made the most errors. · A lesser motor activity which 
was well controlled ~as characteristic of the drivers 
who had high t scores. 
Writers like Beck (1944), Schachtel (1950), and 
Bohm (1951) maintained that the M tendencies affected 
only the mental life of the person and were not in any 
way manifested in the overt motor behaviour of the indi-
vidual . Though Klopfer (1942) thought this way in the 
beginning, he modified his ideas to suggest that the 
M response touched on all the most important aspects of 
the well-functioning personality . Piotrowski (1957) 
pointed out that the individual lives according to his 
role in life and does not merely fantasy about it. He 
felt that there was a kind of a psychic energy present ~n 
M which expressed itself in the way that the individual 
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perceives the world, structures it, and related to it. 
Generally M% implied the more controlled thinking 
operations of the mature ego. A control or delay of 
impulse making for more articulation of thought inter-
posed itself between the activity and its immediately 
associated thoughts, though the association between the 
two was never obliterated. All the determinants which 
gave evidence of the logical control were negatively 
correlated with FE. 
6.1.4 Prediction of accident liability 
The results of the statistical calculations includ-
ed two batteries of the best predictors. In the first 
battery prominence was given to the Co, Fo, and Agg as 
sco res in themselves rather than as components of the 7. 
Pripro . The first battery was arranged in this way to 
discover if any one of the three components could contri-
bute as strongly to the battery of predictors as % Pripro 
did. 
In the battery chosen from fourteen predictors, 
DE emerged as the strongest predictor of the accident 
liability score, (r2 = .719). The DE score indicated 
to what extent the primary process thinking that 
occurred in the Rorschach responses was handled adapt-
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ively. Fishman (1973) used DE as a valid indicator of 
adaptive regression. He suggested that the capacity to 
produce primary process thought in an adaptive manner 
was a very relevant factor in psychoanalytic therapy. 
When DE had all its potential as a predictor exhausted, 
M%, F+%, Co, Fo, Cr, Agg, C'/c, and FC/CF+C were each 
able to contribute something extra, though increasingly 
small, to the complete regression equation. When a 
standard error of estimate was calculated for this 
equation, it was found to amount to 12,57 days. 
At this stage, it was reasoned that the % Pripro 
was definitely an exceedingly strong score and that 
another battery of best predictors should be chosen 
which included % Pripro and which meant that 15 vari-
ables were considered. When the regression equation 
for a battery of 15 predictors had been selected, a 
standard error of estimate of the accident liability 
score with the observed value of the accident liabil-
ity score showed a di f fer ence of 9.72 days . The power 
2 
of % Pripro as the most important predictor (r = .a9o) 
was noted. When % Pripro was calculated as the only 
predictor and a comparison of the standard error of 
estimate of the accident liability score with the 
observed value of the accident liability score was 
made, the difference amounted to 14,93 days. The 
bat tery o f the best pr edictors based on 15 scores contri-
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buted a marg~n of 5.21 days more than % Pripro did. 
The components of the best predictors of the 
acci~ent liability score selected from 15 preoictors 
were as follows: 
1. % Pripro 
2. DE 
3. F+7. 
4. Cr 
5 . FC/CF+C 
6. FL 
7. M/FM 
The importance of % Pripro as the best predictor gave 
added weight to the first hypothesis which related acci-
dent l iability to pr~mary process dominance. DE which 
correlated highly with % Pripro (-,636) has been ment-
ioned above in connection with the best battery of 14 
predictorp. The stu9y aimed a consideration of treat-
ment planning of bad drivers as a conclusion from the 
prediction equation and the fact that DE has already 
been used as a valid indicator of adaptive regression, 
made its appearance as such an important predictor 
very important. 
The addition of F+% as a predictor was well in-
dicated by Beck (1945) as follows: 
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"The F+ potential is thus one of the nvst 
important of the Rorschach test factors. 
It is a measure of the strength with which 
the pe~onality has organized its v~lues, 
the force that holds it together when dis-
ruption threatens, and the central directive 
to which it refers at moments of decision. 
As expressing conscious discrimination and 
judgment, it represents activity of the 
higher, the differentiating cortical centers. 
In so fa~ as this activity refers to a set 
of values that the personality identifies 
with itself, it i c the central directive 
that determines the personality's course . 
The F+ score thus becomes the measure of 
the stability of the persqnality. 
(Beck, 1945, p. 22) 
The entry of Cr into the list of best predictors 
was surprising particularly as it had not correlated 
significantly with any of the other 14 scores. 
FC/CF+C appeared as a predicto r and not FC%. 
Ames et aZ.. (1959) regard the FC as the scoring vari-
able in •~hich growth came slowest and latest and 
Dworetzky (1956) felt tqat CF and C gradually began to 
deGline and FC increased from four years onward to 
puberty. Beck (1945) suggested that CF and C were use-
ful as indicators of inner unrest and emotional insta-
bility. The predictor FC/CF+C possibly contributed to 
the list of best predictor by indicating the level of 
emotional maturity that had taken place in the individual. 
The fact that FL should appear in the list of best 
predictors in addition to F+% was considered unusual. A 
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possible explanation for its occurrence was sought in 
the fact that FL was s cored for all ~he responses and 
its incorporation with colour, shading or o ther determi-
nants a nuance of prediction that was additional to the 
F+%. 
The increased entry of FM into the ratio M/FM 
implied that the perceptions ceased to be evaluated 
according to the best knowledge and experience, with 
t he result that criti~al control was pot as effective 
as in the case of M% alone. 
149 
150 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Suunnary 
The research project attempted firstly, to ascertain 
whether drivers who were rational and mature thinkers were less 
liable to accidents than drivers who were impulsive and immature. 
The first consideration in this connection was the establishment 
of a psychological model, which would support the concepts of 
rational and irrational thinking. Rational thinking was thought 
to exist when the individual was free to choose personally con-
genial paths to personal ly gratifying goals. In these circumsta-
nces the person was neither in the grips of drastic unconscious 
acting out or extreme conforming to reality . Put into diff~rent 
worus, this r.lt~ant that the individual was nei ther bound by primary 
process thinking nor by a se condary process thinking which never 
allowed for any regression in service of the ego. 
Following the establishment of a dichotomy of thought pro-
ces ses ranging from extreme primary process thinking to extreme 
secondary process thinking, the concept of feedback was hypothesi-
zed as being responsible for secondary process thinking. Lack of 
feedback or diminution of f eedback caused a corresponding lack of 
regulat i on of the secondary process thought function with the 
r esult that there was a breakthrough of primary process thinking. 
The ability to monitor or regulate, or to establish critical 
cont rol was equated to the ability to delay gratification or 
impulse. 
The first section of the research attempted to illustrate 
primary and secondary process thinking in relation to accident 
liability; and the second to discover whether Rorschach determi-
nants in a perceptual task were indicative of the degree of 
control of t he feedback functions. 
I n the second part of the research a physical apparatus 
was constructed to create a diminished feedback situation. It 
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was felt that just as regulation occurred at a perceptual or 
mental level that it could also occur at a sensory level. Dimini-
shed feedback on the sensory level would not only give rise to 
greater primary process thinking, but would also correlate with 
accident liability. 
Primary pr ocess thinking was reflected in the first instance 
by the amount of drive related imagery in the content, i.e., the 
extent to which the response contained oral, anal, sexual, exhibi-
tionistic and aggressive images. Secondly, the primary process 
thinking was reflected in the extent to which the form of the 
response deviated from logical, orderly and realistic thinking. 
The degree to which the Rorschach response reflected primary 
process thinking was called the defense demand, and the extent 
to which primary process thinking could· be integrated into a 
more realistic and understandable response was called the 
defense effectiveness of the response. A creativeness score 
showed to what extent the subject was able to regress in service 
of the ego. 
The results in this section showed conclusively that the 
better driver was a more rational and mature thinker. 
It was also concluded that Rorschach determinants which 
had been chosen to indicate the degree of control exercised by 
the driver, gave evidence of the difference between safe and 
accident-repeater drivers. 
In the case of a psychomc)tor experiment, arranged to 
measure errors caused by diminished feedback, it was found 
that the accident repeaters made more errors and appeared to 
be hampered by lesser degr~e of control and more primary 
process thinking. 
7.2 Implications for safe driving 
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Rapaport (1953) reported that the ego's active state led 
to integrated action while the ego's passive state was helpless 
1n the face of drive demand, and by the paralysis of control • . 
Erikson (1964) added that it was the very essence of the ego to 
maintain an active state by selective involvement in actualities. 
He explained acutalities as being the world of participation, 
shared with other participants with a minimum of defensive 
maneuvering and a maximum of mutual activation. 
The activity and participation ascribed to the ego-orient-
ated person was also considered to be a characteristic of the 
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good driver. The present study has indicated the deliberate and 
conscious self-control and the lesser intrusion of primary process 
thinking in the better driver. 
Adequate human movement responses have for instance, been 
taken as instances of the flexibility, versatility of the control 
with which the driver regulates his activities, including his 
driving reactions. 
Significant results were found for all the hypotheses and 
the general high correlations attained in connection with the 
accident liability score was considered an indication of the val-
ue that the results might have for accident prevention. The two 
aspects, selection and therapy need further consideration. 
7.2.1 Selection 
Tests have been proved to be of value in the selection 
of drivers. The work of Shaw (1965) is a case in point. 
She said that tests could fulfil their most important func-
tion, namely to predict future accident involvement with 
a very satisfactory degree of accuracy. Shaw claimed that 
her testing programme possessed enough sensitivity not 
only to distinguish between good and bad risks but also 
to make shades of distinction within the mediocre-to-
bad group. Shaw explained as follows, regarding the 
method used by the assessors in her experiment: 
"In this system the assessor was merely 
asked to analyze the projective material 
by whichever of the methods of analysis 
he found best suited to his own inclina-
tions and training; then to take a blank 
card and write a brief description of 
the totaL personaLity picture~ and the 
sort of overt behaviour he feLt was like-
Ly to resuLt from this pattern. He was 
then asked to make two separate predict-. 
of the potential of the individual_, {1) 
in terms of accident liability_, and (2) 
of potential as an employee. These 
ratings were made on a five-point scaLe. " 
(Shaw, 1965, p. 44) 
In the present study, selection would follow along 
somewhat different lines. In the first instance the 
projective technique was the Rorschach rather than the 
T. A.T. Secondl~ the training of the assessor was very 
specific, namely, a background of ego psychology theory 
for the interpretation of the Rorschach results. A 
battery of predictors was obtained from scores which were 
founded in ego psychology theory and a predicted accident 
liability could be given. 
It has been realized that there is a need to test 
. 
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the efficacy of this predictor before it can be establish-
ed as a useful adjunct in traffic research . Nevertheless 
its implications for selection are evident. 
In many cases selection follows training over a 
period of time when there is little expert knowledge of 
the thought processes of the trainee. The realization 
that the individual is not a suitable driver often occurs 
after a disastrous time on the roads. 
Similarly, the promotion of professional drivers 
might be undertaken according to the knowledge gained 
about the strength of their thought processes. 
Mention has already been made of the selecting-out 
of individuals who are unfit to drive a vehicle. Often 
the lack of capacity of such individuals becomes apparent 
as a result of physiological, or psychomotor tests but it 
will have to be recognised that individuals might have to 
be selected out by virtue of their inability to control 
their primary process thinking and the consequent lack of 
feedback and actualization. Selecting-out might be 
temporary, for an individual might be willing to seek help 
to establish better secondary process thinking. 
7.2.2 Theory 
The accident repeater has been represented as an 
individual whose mode of thinking did not assist him to 
actualize his psychological reality very effectively. 
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Inability to delay impu~se could be the causative factor 
in traffic accidents. Irritations cause emotionalism and 
frustration increases stimulus hunger, and the driver could 
retaliate with rash behaviour in a high-powered vehicle . 
The lack of control displayed by the driver in a situation 
of stress does not differ from the lack of control he would 
display anywhere else. Lack of feedback and the domination 
of primary thought processes threaten his security, and in 
the case of the person with a weaker ego, the attempts at 
mastery are unsuccessful. The remarks made by Marcovitz 
(1973) on aggression as self assertion bear reiteration as 
one recalls the efforts of so many drivers to drive on the 
white line. 
Though very little mention has been made in the liter-
ature of any kind of therapy as a modus opePandi with drive-
rs, it is more than likely that many drivers have had ther-
apy, where they as people have felt that their accident 
repetition was part of their inability t o cope with reality. 
Tillman and Hobbs (1949) have suggested that the driving 
habits of the individual and his high accident record are 
simply one manifestation of a method of living that has been 
demonstrated in their personal lives. They said: 
"If his pepsonal life is marked by caution, 
tolerance, foresight, and consideration 
for othePs then he will drive in the same 
manner. If his personal life is devoid 
of these desirable characteristics then 
his driving wiU be characterized by 
aggressiveness and over a Zong period 
of time he wiU have a much higher 
accident rate than his more stabZe 
companion. " 
(Tillman and Hobbs, 1949, p. 331) 
The present study was much concerned with the adapt-
ation to reality of the individual. It was reasoned that 
the Rorschach was an important instrument in the assess-
ment of ego mastery in the individual and that retesting 
157 
after a period of therapy could be accomplished very success-
fully. The great value of the Rorschach in retesting was 
the fact that it could give an objective measure of changes 
which occurred. Schafer (1967) said, concerning the changes 
after therapy,' that one could look for: 
"· .. evidence in the retests of strengthened 
repressions~ reaction formations~ and 
counterphobic emphases~ improved accuracy 
of reaZity testing~· increased abiZity to 
stave off intrusions of disruptive ego-
centric or autistic preoccupations~ de-
creased emotionaZ ZabiZity or inappro-
priateness~ and improved capacity for 
cont~z~ concentration~ and conformity 
with at Zeast minimaZ demands of convention 
and sociaZ intercourse." 
(Schafer, 1967, p. 51) 
The present study established a battery of the best 
predictors and it would be possible to use this to see 
to what extent there could be an improvement in t he 
estimate of accident liability, after therapy. 
An attempt has been made to use Holt's Rorschach 
mea~ures of primary process thinking for test and then 
retest after therapy. Fishman (1973) did research on 
the adaptive regression of patients during the first 
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s1x months of long term outpatient psychoanalytic therapy. 
He implied that the adaptive regression of the patient 
was viewed as a factor in enabling the patient to indulge 
in free associative exploration of inner life leading to 
enhanced intellectual and emotional self-understanding and 
in turn also to enhanced functioning outside the therapy in 
his daily life. The therapy was conducted within a general 
framework of two aspects of psychoanalytic therapy. First-
ly the intra-therapy or process of therapy focussed on the 
interrelationship between therapist and patient and how 
the patient talked about his problems. The goals were 
firstly for the patient to see the connection between his 
problems and conflicts within himself and secondly to 
allow utterance to primary process thinking without being 
overwhelmed by it. The extra-therapy component was to 
assist in the solving of his actual problems . There was 
a causal relationship between the two, namely that the 
greater the adaptive regression skills the more facility 
in solution of difficult reality situations. He concluded 
that his study lent validity both to a conception of 
adaptive regression as an important characteristic of co-
operatively in therapy, and to Holt ' s DE (defense effect-
iveness) score as a valid indi cator of adaptive regression . 
7.3 Furth~r studies 
Arising out of this study were several aspects which 
war~ant further investigation. 
(a) Replication of the study with other race groups 
(b) Test-rete$t results of accident repeater drivers 
with a period of therapy interspersed 
(c) The relation of speed to feedback 
(d) The relation of fatigue to production of primary 
process thinking 
(e) Diminished feedback and the perception of road 
signs. 
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APPENDIX A 
Calculation of the coefficients of correlation 
The Pearson product-moment coefficient was used 
for the calculation of the coefficients of cor-
relation. Because the work was done on the com-
puter, the following formula was foun·d to be the 
mst convenient . 
2 
r 
xy 
.. 
NXY (X) (Y) 
To find r the square root was extracted. 
xy 
Calculation of the level of significance 
The smallest value of absolute r which is signi-
ficant at the 5% level was obtained from the 
formula: 
(N - 2) 
2 1 - r 
2 
r 
where t is the 5% critical value of students 
t-statistic with n - 2 degrees of freedom. 
Thus the level of significance applied in the 
coefficient of correlation table was 
t = 2,028 
absolute r = 0,32 
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APPENDIX B 
Calculation by means of the Wherry-Doolittle method 
of the battery of the best predictors 
This method, according to Guilford (1956) offers an 
efficient way of assembling a battery of variables or tests 
which meet a particular purpose. From a large number of 
predictive instruments that are tried experimentally, the 
minimum number are chosen that might do the job . It is not 
possible to use the method of factor analysis, because too 
little is really known about the criterion score to reveal 
the factors that are worth trying to predict. In the Wherry-
Doolittle method a start was made by selecting one variable 
which seemed to offer the most in prediction of the criterion. 
The method then aids in selection of the second variable that 
would have the most to add to pr ediction when combined with 
the first. A third would be selected which would add most by 
way of prediction when combined with the first two and so on. 
Two batteries were extracted as follows: 
(a) One from the group of fourteen scores in which 
pripro taken as a composite score did not figure; 
180 
(b) one from the group of fourteen scores plus pripro . 
This was done because it was found that the standard error 
of prediction of the first battery was only slightly smaller than 
that of pripro, when pripro as a composite score was used as a 
predictor on its own. 
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APPENDIX C 
Calculation of regression equations 
It has been noted in the results that three regression 
equations were calculated, v1z., 
(a) an equation for the battery of best predictors 
selected from the group of fourteen scores; 
(b) an equation for the battery of best predictors 
selected from the group of fourteen scores 
plus pripro as a composite score; 
(c) pripro as t he only predictor. 
The equations for (a) and (b) follow from the following 
equations: 
where 
+ 
+ 
w z 
cc 0 
w z 
cc 0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
= 0 and 
= 0 . 
W . . is the co-factor of r .. in the correlation matrix, and 
1] 1J 
z. is the predictor score in standard units. A standard 
1 
units. A standard unit is defined as 
X ~ z .. 
a 
where X is the raw score 
1..1 is the mean 
a is its standard deviation. 
The equation for (c) follows from: 
z 
0 
where 
... 
z 
0 
r 
is the estimated criterion 
score in standard units, 
is the observed pripro 
score in standard units, 
is the coefficient of 
correlation between the 
criterion and pripro. 
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APPENDIX D 
Calculation of standard error of estimate 
The equation for the standard error of estimate is 
as follows: 
s2 
where 
w 
w 
cc 
s 2 
c 
= 
= 
= 
w Sc 2 X 
w 
cc 
the determinant of the correlation matrix 
as above 
the variance of the criterion score. 
The standard error of estimate i s the standard deviation 
of the observed values from their corresponding estimates (i . e., 
the corresponding points on the regression line) . In formula 
form this would be S 
where 
= the sum of (estimated value -
observed value) 2 divided by 
the numher of observations. 
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APPENDIX E 184 
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~ 
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; 
I hi, 
s24: All white spaces 
together 
D6 entire boot 
D2 Lighter gray portion 
projecting at lower corners 
inc luding toe and heel of boot . 
" ... 
' ~ 
d30 
, 
d25 
, 
I 
.... __ 
D5 
d23 luwer edge, b~ginning at D3 and extending t o d22 D9 ( D3 + s27) 
co 
co 
~ 
- - -
• 
' I 
I , 
I ~9 
D5 
D4 : Both d22 as one (+ Db) 
d26 Gray d i n middle of D6 
d24 darke r l ower Dl 
04 + 05 = 08 
03 or S3 
S3 when white included 
d21 entire mid-green s talk 
192 
Dll = D8 + d24 (seen as one entire grey cluster at top) 
d27 lighter half of Dl 
d28 = darker i nner half of Dl 
d35 = "branch" and "group II of Dl 
D4 + D5 = Dlv 
..-I 
0 
H 
-1-J 
1=1 
0 
(.) 
..-I 
Q) 
Q) 
~ -r 
I 
"' §
~ 
APPENDIX F 
' I ', 
/ 
I 
I / 
I 
I_/ 
;: 
194 
" · 
i 
~ 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
collar space for 
Horizontal pin I 
Vertical . pin 1 
Horizontal p1n 2 
Vertical pin 2 
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Driver 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
APPENDIX G 
TMLE1 
Description of the experimentees 
according to the accident liability score 
No. 1 r r + l 
1021 9 10 
269 2 3 
1213 11 12 
841 9 10 
903 9 10 
540 3 4 
642 9 10 
850 3 4 
910 13 14 
1025 13 14 
622 4 5 
927 8 9 
1260 6 7 
810 9 10 
882 7 8 
1121 7 8 
875 7 8 
367 4 5 
510 5 6 
269 2 3 
697 7 8 
2001 9 10 
703 9 10 
387 4 5 
976 6 7 
977 6 7 
568 2 3 
481 2 3 
581 3 4 
1t)24 7 8 
606 3 4 
1267 6 7 
1147 6 7 
736 8 9 
969 8 9 
504 2 3 
601 3 4 
756 3 4 
1. 1 = exposure to risk 
t 
102 
90 
101 
84 
90 
135 
64 
212 
65 
73 
124 
103 
180 
81 
110 
140 
109 
73 
85 
89 
87 
200 
70 
77 
139 
139 
190 
160 
145 
128 
151 
181 
164 
82 
108 
168 
150 
189 
r = number of accidents during the exposure time 
t = the accident liability score 
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Card 1 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
APPENDIX H 
Responses and acoring of the Rorschach Test. 
5s. 
u 
1 
30s 
1 
4ls 
u 
47s 
r 
Example: Driver No. 34 
Beetle (D4 body; d22 shading for the eyes; 
d22, Dl feelers; in a resting position; 
looking down on the top of the beetle; the 
•hading forms a design on the back of the 
beetle; the male used to make a dung ball 
and the female lays the eggs in the dung 
ball; I like snakes.) 
Co: L 2 A 
Fo : 
DD: 2 
DE: 1 
FL: -1 
Cr : 3 
D: F+: A 
Hammerhead shark (D2 , d21 part of the head 
and body; I can see the tip of the nose 
and the eye; he is rolling in the surf; 
a kind of a dangerous customer.) 
Co: Ag 2 PS 
Fo: 
DD: 2 
DE: 1 
FL: - 3 
Cr: 4 
D: FMV: A 
Two birds (In flight; d21 tip of the wing; 
D2 the wing; D5 is the tail; the head has 
a crest; it is flying over a crag.) 
Co : 
Fo: 
DD : 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
Dd: FM: A 
-1 
4 
Chicken (Day-old chick; black dot ~s the 
eye; d25 another chicken eye; still in 
the nest peeping out.) 
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60s 
Card 2 
a. 15s 
u,r, 
d. 
b. 39s 
1, r, 
c. 49s 
1 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
d: FMV: A 
-2 
3 
Bear's head (Reaching up at something; 
Dl, d31 ears; d28 paws; they are nice old 
chaps.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE 
FL: 1 
Cr: 2 
Dd: FM: A 
Butterfly (D3 .wings on either side; it 
could be resting; it is a reddish butterfly; 
quite nice.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FC: A 
-1 
4 
Socks (D2 both sides; bed socks; design 
on the middle and the other toe; the socks 
are pulled down and over; Demonstrates.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE : 
FL: -1 
Cr: 4 
D: F+: Obj, Cl. 
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d. 85s 
d 
1 
Calf (Dl, d26 mostly the head of the calf; 
horn protruding from forehead; sucking at 
breast; will definitely be a bull; 
breast bone protrudes more in the bull calf; 
he will grow up to be a black Taurus bully 
love bull.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FM: A 
L 2 0 
VP 2; Aut El 2 
L 2 0 (3); VP 2 (3); Au El 2 (3) 
Total 9 
-2 
0 
3 
e. llOs Top (D4 pLn has come out of this top; 
spinning in an upright position; the edge 
is wavery because it is spinning.) 
Co: 
Fo : 
DD: 
DE: 
FL : 
Cr: 
D: mF: Obj . 
120s 
1 
4 
Card 3 
a. 30s 
r 
d 
38s 
Bushman (D6 bust etc.; head with beard; 
upper lip protruding; nose flat and up-
turned; lash of eye sticking out; frizzy 
hair . ) 
Co: L 1 H 
Fo: 
DD: 4 
DE: 1 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
D: FC' c: H 
u Bearded head (Dll, d30; white patch is eye; 
saintly look to reform the world; sucking 
a pipe; d27 is beard; hasn't a care in the 
world . ) 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
49s 
u 
68s 
u 
r 
8ls 
d 
l 
94s 
u 
l25s. 
Co: L 2 0 
Fo: DW l 
DD: 6 
DE: 1 
FL: -1 
Cr: 3 
Ds: Me: H 
Monkey (D2 sitting on the ground; tail is 
out in front of him; head is turned; some-
thing has attracted his attention.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: - 1 
Cr: 3 
D: FM: A 
Squirrel (D2 tail is curled behind him; 
looking at something on the ground.) 
Now its a rat climbing a tree. 
Co : 
Fo: Trans 1. 
DD : 3 
DE: 1 
FL: l 
Cr: 4 
D: FM: A 
Night owl (d22 wing outstretched; d2l is 
the beak; the white patch is the eye; 
it is flying away. ) Away old to-whit! 
Co: 
Fo : Aut El 2 
DD: 2 
DE: 2 
FL: -2 
Cr: 4 
ds: FM: A 
Trees (D6 their branches are moving slightly.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 0 
Cr: 3 
D: Fm: Bot 
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Card 4 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Card 5 
a. 
Ss 
u 
1 
d 
70s 
1 
r 
1 
82s 
90s. 
60a 
u 
1 
Coral (D3 and top of D7 small pieces of 
coral are protruding; it has a shell and 
the coral is growing on the shell; now 
it looks like a witch with a hat and 
stringy hair; the dark shading is her 
cloak.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE : 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: F+: A,H 
Ag 2 PS 
Trans 
5 
-2 
-1 
3 
Bear rug (Dl is hind part, d23 the legs, 
d30 the tail; the top part has been fol-
ded under; is moth-eaten around the 
head.) 
Co : 
Fo : 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FC': Ad 
Ag 2 R 
2 
1 
1 
3 
Possum (D4 is the head; the tail is up-
right and it stands next to a tree. The 
tail is not bushy enough - it is alert, 
looking for graze; its time for mine'.) 
Co: L 2 A 
Fo: S - R 1 
DD: 4 
DE: 1 
FL: - 1 
Cr: 3 
D: FM: A 
A vampire bat (W it ~s flying because the 
wings are outstretched; D2 are the feelers; 
got strong claws for gripping;) Not so nice! 
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b. 
c. 
d. 
64s 
1 
d 
73s 
1 
u 
80s 
1 
d 
Co: Ag 2 AS 
Fo: 
DD: 2 
DE: 1 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
W: FM: A 
The bat changes to a butterfly (Whole ex-
cept for Dl, d22; it is in flight; there 
is a dark line down the back; D7 is the 
body.) A nicer one! 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr : 
"W: FMC': A 
Trans 
3 
0 
1 
4 
Head (D4 egg-shaped head with a rooster's 
co~ on top; big ear to the back of the 
head; an old viking helmet - the bottom is 
obscured by a collar . ) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
C-eo 2, Trans 
5 
-1 
-3 
3 
D: F-: Ad, Obj. 
Tweezers (D3 open position with two prongs; 
slightly bent as a caliper; thumb and 
fingers seem joined on an gripping the 
tweezers.) Strange! 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD : 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
Ca-l 2 
3 
1 
1 
4 
D: F+: Obj., Hd. 
e. lSls Lamb's leg (Dl hind leg of a lamb, with 
u its protruding toes; now there is a white 
line that is a skewer and the leg is now 
a roasted leg on the skewer.) Nice! 
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Card 6 
a. 
b. 
c. 
30s 
u 
1 
50s 
d 
79s 
1 
Co: L 2 A 
Fo: Trans 
DD: 4 
DE: 1 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
Ds: F+: Meat, Obj. 
Monstrance, chalice (d22 is stick; D7 is 
the crucifix fitted into the stick at the 
point.) A beautiful picture. 
Co: L 2 0 
Fo: 
DD: 2 
DE: 1 
FL: -1 
Cr: 2 
D: F+: Cere., Obj. 
A bear rug (D4, d27 and d23 the main 
portion, front legs and hind legs; skin 
has been stretched and dark shading rep-
resents a brown bear; head has been re-
moved.) 
Co: Ag 2 R 
Fo : 
DD: 2 
DE : 1 
FL : 1 
Cr : 4 
~: FC': Ad 
Rocket (D7 rocket going into orbit; d22 
is the dark smoke trial; shading on the 
side is the glow from the rocket; a peace 
and war weapon.) 
Co: 
Fo: Ctr. L 1 
DD : 3 
DE : 1 
FL: -1 
Cr: 2 
D: FC'm: Obj ., Fire, Smoke 
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d. lOls Dolphin's head (d27; it looks for fish 
e. 
Card 7 
a. 
b . 
u but this one has a bun in his mouth.) 
1 
d 
r 
u 
112s 
1 
12ls. 
lOs 
u 
2ls 
d 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: F+: A 
Ag 2 AS 
Ctr L 1 
4 
-1 
-1 
3 
Totem pole (D7 top part is the head with 
two horns; a wise, rather friendly Indian 
chi~f; the pole is set on a hill; in war 
the banners contain eagle feathers - not 
war now. ) 
Co : 
Fo : Aut El 2, C-eo 2 
DD : 4 
DE: 0 
FL: -1 
Cr: 4 
D: F+ : Cere 
Pigtails (DS bow on both sides; hair is 
s tanding up . ) 
Co: 
Fo : 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
D: Fe: Hd 
Animal face (D3 on the right hand side; 
very furry neck.) 
Co : 
Fo : 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: -1 
Cr: 3 
D: Fe: Ad 
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c. 
d . 
e . 
Card 8 
a. 
9h 
d 
99s 
u 
110~:~ 
1 
u 
235s. 
90s 
u 
r 
Monster (D3 - on the left hand side; large 
teeth and ferocious eye. Going to attack.) 
This is a good one! 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FM: A 
Ag 2 AS 
2 
1 
1 
4 
Lioness (d22 no mane so it must be a 
lioness; the head is heavy and thick but 
no mane; could be the head of a fox ter-
rier; watching carefully.) 
Co: Ag 2 AS 
Fo: Trans 
DD: 5 
DE: 1 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
D: FM: A 
A growling bear (D3 stalking something; 
also a big fierce dog; rather furry, too.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
D:P: 
FL: 
Cr: 
DE: 
D: FMc:A 
Ag 2 .AS 
Trans 
5 
1 
4 
1 
Animal. a rodent (Dl long and furry; bas-
hing at something with his paw. ) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FMc: A 
Ag 2 AS 
2 
1 
1 
4 
205 
b. 80s 
d 
Butterfly with outstretched wings; pretty 
design and colour on wings; feelers are 
across two pretty flowers . ) 
Co : L 2 s 
Fo: c a-c u2 
DD: 4 
DE: -2 
Fl: -1 
Cr: 3 
D: FC: A, Bot. 
c. lSOs Dangerous stingray (D4 swimming in the 
u water; looking up at him. ) 
d. 
Card 9 
a. 
180s 
1 
189s. 
30s 
d 
Co: Ag 2 PS 
Fo : 
DD: 2 
DE : 0 
FL: 0 
Cr: 3 
D: FM: A 
Butterfly (06, D7 four sets of wings; 
beauti ful colours; it is a male because 
he has a longer body than the female . ) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 1 
Cr: 4 
D: FC: A 
Hippo (D1 Head only ; not a rhinoceros 
because it doesn't have a horn. Waving 
head sleepily - sort of come and join 
me style . ) 
Co: 
Fo: Au El 2 
DD: 2 
DE: 0 
FL: -1 
Cr: 4 
D: FM: A 
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b. 
c. 
d. 
57s 
1 
64s 
1 
78s 
u 
Head of a leguan (D2, d22 lovely colour; 
it could be the mouth of a dragon; it 
has a sleepy eye; its the head of the 
leguan because of the colour.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
D: FC: A 
c p-f 1 
3 
-1 
-1 
4 
A monster (Dl he has the west wind in his 
cheeks.) 
Co: Ag 1 PS 
Fo: C a-c u2 
DD: 5 
DE: -1 
FL: -2 
Cr: 3 
D: F-: A, Confab. 
Dinosaur head (D2, D3 not a bad type) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL : -2 
Cr: 3 
D: F-: A 
e. 128s Doll's head (D4 a bonnet is tied around 
u the head; it is made of crimply material.) 
1 
Co: 
Fo; 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: 
Cr: 
-2 
3 
D: F+: Cloth. 
207 
f. 76s 
g. 136s 
159s. 
h. 156s 
325s. 
Card 10 
a. 6s 
A wishbone (D4 just that shape.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: -1 
Cr: 3 
D: F+: Ad 
A statue of some kind (DS just between 
two things - thats all.) 
Co: ..:.. 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: -1 
Cr: 4 
D: F-: Cere. 
A toby fish (d24 just the face of the 
fish) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: -2 
Cr: 4 
d: F+: A 
A carpet design (W; the many different 
colours strike one immediately.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL: -3 
Cr: 3 
W: CF: Obj. 
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b. 20s 
c. 56s 
Two strange creatures (Dl can see an eye 
and legs; I don't know what they are but 
they could represent loneliness. 
Co: 
Fo: 1 Sym 2 
DD: 1 
DE: 0 
FL: ":"3 
Cr: 3 
D: F-: A 
Two flower petals (D9 just the colour; 
could be orchid petals.) 
Co: 
Fo: 
DD: 
DE: 
FL : -1 
Cr: 4 
D: FC: Bot. 
Scores obtained 
No. of responses: 48 
No. of responses containing primary process 
thinking: 30 
No . of responses containing primary process 
content: 20 
No. of responses containing pr~mary process 
aggressive content: 12 
No. of responses containing primary process 
formal aspects: 22 
Total DE score: 19-10 
- 9 
Total DD score: 102 . 
Total FL score: 27 
Total Cr score: 166 
209 
210 
Representation of scores according to scoring categories: 
% Pripro 63 
Co ,42 
Fo ,48 
Agg '25 
/ 
DE ,30 
DO 3,40 
FL ,56 
Cr 3,5 
M% 2 
M/FM ,06 
FC% 11 
FC/CF+C 5 
C'/c ,80 
F+% 66 
APPENDIX I 
Scoring on the modified version of the Moede two-
hand motor coordination test. 
Example: Driver No. 34 
Normal feedback task 
Trial 1 16,5 
" 2 11,5 
" 3 10,0 
" 4 12,0 
" 5 12,5 
Total 62,5 
Average 12,5 
Diminished feedback task 
Trial 1 22,5 
" 2 19,5 
" 3 21,0 
" 4 12,5 
" 5 13,0 
Total 88,5 
Average 17,7 
Feedback error score= 17,7- 12,5 = 5,2. 
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